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TEXAS CIVIL PROCEDURE
Ernest E. Figari, Jr., *
A. Erin Dwyer*
Donald Colleluori***
THE major developments in the field of civil procedure during the Sur-
vey period occurred through judicial decisions.
I. JURISDICTION OF THE SUBJECT MATTER
Carlisle v. Bennett I addressed the power of a district court to adjudicate a
claim by a beneficiary of an estate alleging that the executrix had conspired
to sell an asset of the estate at less than its true value. While section 5(e) of
the Texas Probate Code2 authorizes courts exercising original probate juris-
diction to hear all matters "incident to an estate," this language has been
held to be limited to those disputes in which the controlling issue concerns
matters relating to the settlement, partition, or distribution of an estate.3
Finding that the controlling issue in the beneficiary's claim was the sale of
the estate's asset by the executrix in breach of her fiduciary duties, and there-
fore a matter relating to the distribution of the estate4, the court in Carlisle
held that under section 5(e) the probate court had exclusive jurisdiction over
the claim and affirmed the district court's dismissal of it.5 It should be noted
that this decision adds to the conflict between other courts of appeal on the
question of whether the probate court has exclusive jurisdiction over matters
incident to an estate; 6 and, as a result, the question would appear to be ripe
for resolution by the supreme court.
The court in Picon Transportation, Inc. v. Pomeranz7 was confronted with
• B.S., Texas A & M University; LL.B., University of Texas; LL.M., Southern Method-
ist University. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
•* B.A., University of Notre Dame; J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Dallas,
Texas.
•** B.A., Dickinson College; J.D., New York University. Attorney at Law, Dallas,
Texas.
1. 801 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1990, no writ).
2. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5(e) (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1992).
3. See Seay v. Hall, 677 S.W.2d 19, 23 (Tex. 1984). See generally Ernest E. Figari, Jr.,
Thomas H. Graves & A. Erin Dwyer, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 40
Sw. L.J. 491, 491-92 (1986) [hereinafter cited as 1986 Annual Survey].
4. 801 S.W.2d at 591.
5. Id.
6. Compare Thomas v. Toolon, 609 S.W.2d 859, 861 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (finding exclusive jurisdiction in probate court), with Goodwin v.
Kent, 745 S.W.2d 466, 469 n.5 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1988, writ denied) (rejecting exclusive juris-
diction in probate court).
7. 814 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied) (2-1 decision).
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an unexpected jury verdict which had jurisdictional implications. The plain-
tiff asserted a claim for personal injury seeking to recover damages of "not
less than" $49,860 in a county court whose jurisdictional limit was
$50,000. 9 Nevertheless, after a jury awarded total damages of $125,000, the
significant portion of which had accrued prior to suit, the county court en-
tered a judgment for the full amount and an appeal ensued.' 0 Disagreeing
with the action of the county court, the appellate court reduced the judg-
ment to $50,000, concluding that the trial court had no power in this in-
stance to award damages above its jurisdictional limit.II
II. JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance, Ltd. v. English China Clays,
P.L.C, 12 a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Texas, is the most signifi-
cant decision during the survey period in the area of personal jurisdiction. 13
Guardian Royal is noteworthy because it is the first authoritative decision in
Texas to address the assertion of personal jurisdiction over an alien insur-
ance company under the "territory-of-coverage" approach. 4 The nonresi-
dent defendant, an English insurer with no ties to the United States, issued
an insurance policy to an English company. The policy provided liability
coverage to the policy holder and its subsidiaries, one of whom was noted in
an endorsement to the policy as being located in the U.S.A. This subsidiary,
a Texas corporation, subsequently settled a liability claim brought against it
arising out of an accident that occurred in Texas. A dispute thereafter arose
over the alien insurer's duty to reimburse the Texas subsidiary under the
policy that had been issued to its English parent; and the subsidiary sued the
insurer in Texas for breach of contract and effected service under the Texas
long-arm statute. The insurer objected to personal jurisdiction and, after the
trial court sustained the challenge, an appeal followed. Conceding that the
insurance agreement was between two English companies, was negotiated
and implemented in England, and did not reference Texas, the court of ap-
peals nevertheless reversed and held the alien insurer subject to suit in
Texas.15 The court of appeals reasoned that since the insurer had agreed to
8. 814 S.W.2d at 490.
9. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 25.0452(a)(2) (Vernon 1988).
10. 814 S.W.2d at 490.
11. Id.
12. 815 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. 1991).
13. See generally Ernest E. Figari, A. Erin Dwyer & Donald Colleluori, Texas Civil Proce-
dure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 44 Sw. L.J. 541, 544-45 (1990) [hereinafter cited as 1990
Annual Survey].
14. "In exercising jurisdiction [over alien insurance companies], the courts infer the neces-
sary contact from policy language defining the territory of coverage. In short, if the geographi-
cal scope of the coverage includes the forum state, then the court, having jurisdiction over the
insured, may exercise jurisdiction over the insurer as well." William C. Hoffman, Personal
Jurisdiction Over Alien Insurance Companies: The Territory-of-Coverage Rule, 26 TORT & IN-
SUR. L. J. 703 (1991).
15. Southern Clay Prod., Inc. v. Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance, Ltd., 762 S.W.2d 927,




cover risks anywhere in the world, this was sufficient notice of potentially
insured activities throughout the United States, including Texas. 16 Thus,
according to the court of appeals, the acceptance of this broad risk indicated
the alien insurer's willingness to be haled into court in any state where a
United States subsidiary was involved with a covered accident. 17
Undaunted, the insurer sought review of the matter by the Supreme Court
of Texas. Observing that the federal due process inquiry was divided into
two parts, the court reiterated (1) that the nonresident defendant must have
purposefully established "minimum contacts" with the forum state; and
(2) that the exercise of jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant must
comport with "fair play and substantial justice."' 8 Although the policy was
a liability policy for a risk with a fixed locale (i.e., the United States), the
insurer was unaware of the subsidiary's specific location within the United
States. Nevertheless, observing that an endorsement to the policy provided
it would be treated as if a separate insurance policy had been issued to each
subsidiary, the supreme court concluded that the insurer could reasonably
anticipate that a coverage dispute with a subsidiary would arise concerning
litigation in any state of the United States. 19 On this basis the court con-
cluded that the alien insurer had purposefully established the necessary con-
tacts with Texas.20
Turning its attention to whether the assertion of jurisdiction over the in-
surer was fair, the supreme court emphasized that the suit did not involve a
Texas resident and, as a result, Texas had only a minimal interest in adjudi-
cating the dispute.2' Since requiring submission of a dispute between an
English insurer and its English insured to the United State's judicial system
would be burdensome, the court found that such assertion was unreasonable
and, for this reason, held personal jurisdiction over the alien insurer
lacking.22
A case decided shortly thereafter, El Paso Reyco, Inc. v. Malaysia British
Assurance23 , also followed the "territory-of-coverage" approach in address-
ing a jurisdictional dispute involving an alien reinsurer. The alien reinsurer,
a Malaysia company having no connection with Texas, reinsured a nonresi-
dent primary insurer which, in turn, provided insurance coverage to a Texas
corporation. After the individual plaintiff, a Texas resident, recovered a
judgment against the insured Texas corporation, the two joined together in a
suit against the primary insurer on the primary coverage. By the time they
obtained a judgment, however, the primary insurer was insolvent. Thereaf-
ter, the Texas plaintiffs focused on the Malaysian reinsurer for satisfaction of
16. 762 S.W.2d at 932.
17. Id.
18. 815 S.W.2d at 226 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475-76
(1985)). See also Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984).
19. 815 S.W.2d at 231-32.
20. Id. at 232.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 232-33.
23. 808 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. App.-El Paso, Apr. 3, 1991, writ requested).
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their recovery. They sued the reinsurer in Texas on its reinsurance agree-
ment and effected service under the long-arm statute. The alien reinsurer
objected to personal jurisdiction, the trial court sustained the challenge, and
the plaintiffs thereafter commenced an appeal.
As framed by the court of appeals, the question was whether a Texas
court may exercise jurisdiction over an alien reinsurer whose only contact
with Texas was entering into a reinsurance agreement with a now insolvent
nonresident primary insurer, who had insured a Texas corporation against
whom there is an outstanding final judgment remaining unpaid. 24 Noting
that the alien reinsurer's memorandum of insurance with the primary in-
surer specified that such insurer would be writing casualty insurance within
the United States, the court of appeals adhered to the "territory-of-cover-
age" approach and concluded the reinsurer had the necessary relationship
with the forum state to sustain jurisdiction over its person.25 As regards the
fairness of requiring the alien reinsurer to defend in Texas, the court con-
cluded that Texas had a manifest interest in providing a forum for the Texas
plaintiffs to adjudicate their disputes, reasoning that if the plaintiffs had to
follow the reinsurer to a distant country to secure redress, they would be
severely disadvantaged. 26 Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the
trial court and held that Texas courts were obliged to assume jurisdiction. 27
A relatively obscure provision 28 of the Texas long-arm statute also re-
ceived attention during the Survey period. A provision of that statute stipu-
lates that when process is delivered to the Secretary of State for forwarding
to a nonresident defendant, the Secretary of State "shall require a statement
of the name and address of the nonresident's home or home office" to facili-
tate such forwarding. 29 Security Pacific Corp. v. Lupo30 recently considered
this address requirement as it related to a corporate defendant. The record
before the court revealed that the Secretary of State received only the de-
fendant's "address in California" and that he forwarded process to that loca-
tion. The plaintiff obtained a default judgment based on this service, and the
defendant sought to set it aside, arguing noncompliance with the statutory
provision. Observing that nothing in the record showed that the California
address furnished the Secretary of State was the home office address required
by the statute, the court concluded the statute had not been satisfied and set
aside the judgment.3
24. Id. at 529.
25. Id. at 530-31.
26. Id. at 531.
27. Id.
28. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.045 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
29. Id.
30. 808 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
31. Id. at 127; see Bank of America v. Love, 770 S.W.2d 890, 891-92 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1989, writ denied) (default judgment void due to lack of strict compliance with statu-
tory requirements); Carjan Corp. v. Sonner, 765 S.W.2d 553, 555 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1989, no writ) (service ineffective in absence of forwarding to defendant's home office); Verges
v. Lomas Nettleton Fin. Corp., 642 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ) (strict




Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 120a governs special appearances to chal-
lenge personal jurisdiction in state court. Rule 120a requires a party making
a special appearance to have the appearance heard prior to any other plea or
motion.32 A dilemma arises when counsel is asked to represent a nonresi-
dent defendant against whom a default judgment has been taken and the
defendant is not subject to the personal jurisdiction of the forum. The court
may rule that counsel's action amounts to a general appearance if counsel
files a special appearance followed by a motion for new trial.33 The defend-
ant is then obliged to defend the suit in Texas if the motion for new trial is
acted upon and the default judgment set aside. 34 One decision during the
Survey period appears to have provided a solution to this dilemma. 35
In Koch Graphics, Inc. v. Avantech, Inc. 36 the trial court entered a partial
default judgment because the time within which the defendant had to file an
answer expired after nonresident service was effected. Approximately one
month later, while the partial default was still interlocutory, the defendant
filed a special appearance. Subject to the special appearance, the defendant
also filed a motion to quash service, a motion for new trial, and an answer.
Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff filed an amended answer deleting the claims
not previously adjudicated by default, thereby making the default judgment
final. Subsequently, the trial court held a hearing on the special appearance,
but overruled it on the basis it did not have the power to entertain the matter
after the default judgment had been entered. The trial court then denied the
motions to quash service and for new trial; and the defendant prosecuted an
appeal.
The appellate court ruled that the trial court had the power to address the
special appearance after the entry of a default judgment and, indeed, could
do so until it lost its plenary power over the judgment.3 7 Further, rejecting
the plaintiff's contention that the special appearance had been waived when
the defendant submitted its motion for new trial and other filings, the court
emphasized that those filings were expressly made subject to the special ap-
pearance and therefore did not result in a waiver. 38 The court, in turn, con-
sidered the special appearance on its merits and held the trial court lacked
personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 39
The standard of review applicable on appeal to a ruling on a special ap-
soc., Inc., 105 F.R.D. 1, 2 (S.D. Tex. 1984) (designated agent's address insufficient to satisfy
compliance requirement).
32. TEX. R. Civ. P. 120a(1).
33. See Liberty Enter., Inc. v. Moore Transp. Co., 690 S.W.2d 570, 571-72 (Tex. 1985).
34. Id.
35. Koch Graphics, Inc. v. Avantech, Inc., 803 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, no
writ).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 433.
38. Id. Cf. Liberty Enter. v. Moore Transp. Co., 690 S.W.2d 570, 571-72 (Tex. 1985)
(filing of unconditional motion for new trial waives previously filed special appearance).
39. 803 S.W.2d at 433-35.
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pearance was considered in Bellair, Inc. v. A viall of Texas, Inc. 4 and NCNB
Texas National Bank v. Anderson 41. Bellair arose out of an appeal from the
denial of a special appearance. Comparing a challenge to personal jurisdic-
tion through a special appearance to a challenge to venue, the court applied
the statutory standard of review applicable to the appeal of venue rulings42
and, after doing so, relied upon the entire record in the trial court in sus-
taining the trial court's denial of the special appearance. 43 However, the
decision offers almost no basis for applying a statutorily-created standard of
review,44 expressly restricted to venue rulings45, to the review of a denial of a
special appearance.
In Anderson, on the other hand, the appellant urged that a summary judg-
ment standard of review should be applied in reviewing an order sustaining a
defendant's special appearance, presumably to enable him to argue that the
evidence adduced at the special appearance hearing did not establish as a
matter of law that there was no genuine issue of material fact.46 Finding
little similarity between the two sets of procedures, the court held there was
no valid reason for applying a summary judgment standard of review to ap-
peals from a special appearance.47
Finally, two cases recently considered the type of conduct that will result
in a waiver of a special appearance. The court in Slater v. Metro Nissan of
Montclair,4 8 relying on the requirement in rule 120a that a special appear-
40. 819 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. App.-Dallas, Sept. 30, 1991, writ requested) (2-1 decision).
41. 812 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, no writ).
42. 819 S.W.2d at 898. The ruling on a venue hearing is not immediately appealable, and
the appellate court will consider the entire record, including evidence presented at the trial on
the merits. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.064 (Vernon 1986).
43. 819 S.W.2d at 898. Specifically, the appellate court relied on answers to requests for
admissions submitted after the special appearance hearing in support of a motion for summary
judgment. Id. See Franklin v. Geotechnical Services, Inc., 819 S.W.2d 219, 223 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth, Nov. 6, 1991, n.w.h.) (appellate reliance placed on portion of deposition on file,
but not read into record at special appearance hearing, in sustaining dismissal for lack of
personal jurisdiction).
44. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.064(b) (Vernon 1986) ("In determin-
ing whether venue was or was not proper, the appellate court shall consider the entire record,
including the trial on the merits.") TEX. R. Civ. P. 120a, which governs special appearance
practice in Texas, contains no similar provision. To the contrary, as noted by the dissent in
Bellair, "the rule governing special appearances strongly suggests that discovery practices tra-
ditionally associated with a trial on the merits, such as the serving of requests for admissions,
shall have no adverse effect on a party's right to object to trial court jurisdiction" and, for that
reason, would "limit... [appellate] review to the record before the trial court when it denied
... [the] special appearance." Bellair, 819 S.W.2d at 900. (Rowe, J., dissenting).
45. See, e.g., Tex. City Ref., Inc. v. Conoco, Inc., 767 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied); Lewis v. Exxon Co., 786 S.W.2d 724, 728 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1989, writ denied). See generally W. Wendell Hall, Standards of Appellate
Review in Civil Appeals, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 865, 870-71 (1990).
46. See Gibbs v. General Motors Corp., 450 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex. 1970) (on an appeal
from a summary judgment the question is "whether the summary judgment proof establishes
as a matter of law that there is no genuine issue of fact as to one or more of the essential
elements of the plaintiff's cause of action") (emphasis added); see generally W. Wendell Hall,
Standards of Appellate Review in Civil Cases, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 865, 881-83 (1990).
47. 812 S.W.2d at 443.
48. 801 S.W.2d 253 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, writ denied).
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ance "shall be made by sworn motion", 49 held that a special appearance
(1) must be direct and unequivocal and (2) must be based on the personal
knowledge of the affiant. 50 It is noteworthy that no special exception was
leveled at the special appearance in the trial court. Nevertheless, under its
view of the verification requirement of rule 120a, the appellate court con-
cluded that, with respect to the defendant's special appearance, it was
neither direct and unequivocal nor based on the personal knowledge of the
affiant.51 Accordingly, the court ruled that the defendant had waived its
special appearance and, by filing the deficient special appearance, had sub-
mitted its person to the jurisdiction of the court. 52
In In the Interest of S.A. V and KE. V 5 3 the defendant made a plea to the
subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court and also challenged personal
jurisdiction through the filing of a special appearance. Noting that the de-
fendant had first attacked subject matter jurisdiction and had made no at-
tempt to assert such objection in the alternative to his special appearance,
the court found that the defendant's order of attack had waived his special
appearance and he had thereby generally appeared before the trial court.54
IV. SERVICE OF PROCESS
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 107 provides that "[n]o default judgment
shall be granted in any cause until the citation ... shall have been on file
with the clerk of the court ten days, exclusive of the day of filing and the day
of judgment." 5 HB & WM, Inc. v. Smith 56 considered the validity of a
default judgment where the omission of a file date on the citation caused
uncertainty as to fulfillment of the ten day requirement. The court in Smith,
joining with earlier cases, 57 set aside the default judgment because, in the
absence of a file mark on the citation showing when it had been filed, the
record did not affirmatively show compliance with rule 107.58
Martinez v. Wilber 59 is a warning that the file number on a citation should
also be checked for errors before service with it is effected. Texas Rule of
49. TEX. R. CIv. P. 120a. See also Villalpando v. De La Garza, 793 S.W.2d 274, 276
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ) (ruling that an unsworn special appearance consti-
tuted a general appearance).
50. 801 S.W.2d at 254.
51. Id. at 255.
52. Id.
53. 798 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1990, writ granted).
54. Id. at 300; see also Portland Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Bernstein, 693 S.W.2d 478, 480
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (filings which were not made subject to the
special appearance resulted in waiver of the special appearance), vacated 716 S.W.2d 532 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi, 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986).
55. TEX. R. Civ. P. 107.
56. 802 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, no writ).
57. See Gerdes v. Marion State Bank, 774 S.W.2d 63, 65 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989,
writ denied); Gentry v. Gentry, 550 S.W.2d 167, 167-168 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no
writ); First Nat'l Bank of Fabens v. Pacific Cotton Agency, 329 S.W.2d 504, 505-06 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1959, no writ), Citizens Nat'l Bank in Ennis v. Hart, 321 S.W.2d 319, 320
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1959, writ ref'd).
58. 802 S.W.2d at 282.
59. 810 S.W.2d 461 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, writ denied) (2-1 decision).
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Civil Procedure 99(b) mandates that a citation shall show, among other
things, the "file number" of the cause out of which it is issued.60 In Marti-
nez the plaintiff filed suit against two defendants but subsequently amended
his petition to name three additional defendants. Before citation was issued
for the newly-added defendants, however, the trial court severed the claims
against them from the original suit and they were docketed under a new file
number. Nevertheless, when citations were issued for the three defendants,
the original file number was utilized and, as a result, service was effected
under that number. Thereafter, on the basis of such citation, a default judg-
ment was entered against one defendant in the severed case when that de-
fendant failed to appear or answer. After the default judgment became final
the defendant attacked it by writ of error. Noting that the citation bore the
incorrect file number and therefore violated rule 99(b), the court found that
the defect was fatal and set aside the default judgment.61
V. PLEADINGS
Rule 13 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure,62 aimed at deterring the
filing of frivolous pleadings,63 was the subject of judicial attention during the
Survey period. Rule 13 has always provided that the signatures of attorneys
or parties on a court filing certify that they have read it and that the filing "is
not groundless and brought in bad faith or groundless and brought for the
purpose of harassment."' ' The rule defines groundless as "no basis in law or
fact and not warranted by good faith argument for the extension, modifica-
tion or reversal of existing law."' 65 Sanctions shall be imposed by the court,
upon motion or its own initiative, upon either or both the person who signed
a filing in violation of the rule and the represented party.66 In a case of first
60. TEX. R. Civ. P. 99(b).
61. 810 S.W.2d at 463; see also Guitierrez v. Cuellar, 236 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1922, no writ) (lack of file number in citation is fatal defect); Duke v.
Spiller, I I S.W. 787 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908, no writ) (default judgment set aside where citation
failed to state file number).
62. TEX. R. Civ. P. 13.
63. See generally Anthony Benedetto & David Keltner, Changes in Pleading Practices
(Including the Frivolous Suit Question), 1987 ST. MARY'S NINTH ANNUAL PROCEDURAL IN-
STITUTE: CIVIL PROCEDURE 1988-RULES AND STATUTORY CHANGES F-2 to F-12 (discuss-
ing legislative history, purpose, and effect of rule 13); Elaine A. Carlson, Procedural Changes
Mandated by the 1988 Rule Changes, 6 ADVOC. 22, 23 (1987) (discussing frivolous suit deter-
rence purpose of rule 13).
64. TEX. R. Civ. P. 13; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 1I (analogous federal rule governing
signing of pleadings). See generally 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, FED. PRAC. &
PROC. §§ 1331-35 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing federal analogous to TEX. R. Civ. P. 13).
65. TEX. R. Civ. P. 13. Rule 13 may lead to a resurgence in special exception practice in
Texas. Traditionally, a special exception may be used, among other things, to force the
pleader to allege all essential elements of his cause of action. See, e.g., Covington v. Associated
Employers Lloyds, 195 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1946, writ ref'd). Inter-
acting with special exception practice, rule 13 prohibits a pleader from making a statement in
his pleading known to be groundless and false and authorizes the imposition of sanctions if a
violation occurs. Thus, if an essential allegation known to be without evidentiary support is
omitted from a pleading, the pleader might avoid the threat of rule 13. As a result, special
exception practice may be utilized to compel the full pleading of a cause of action so as to
subject previously omitted allegations to the scrutiny of rule 13.
66. TEX. R. Civ. P. 13. It should be noted that one case during a prior survey period
1382 [Vol. 45
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impression in Texas the court in Home Owners Funding Corp. v. Scheppler6V,
following the lead of pertinent federal authority,68 held that appellate review
of an order granting or denying relief under rule 13 should be by way of an
"abuse of discretion" standard and not through a de novo review. 69
Two decisions of the supreme court concerned the proper assertion of af-
firmative defenses in pleadings. In Roark v. Stallworth Oil & Gas, Inc. 70 the
supreme court had to decide whether an affirmative defense (e.g., lack of
consideration), that had not been alleged in an answer as required by rule
94,71 could nevertheless provide a basis for summary judgment when the
defense was raised in the summary judgment motion and the non-movant
had failed to object to the defect before the rendition of such judgment. Lik-
ening a summary judgment hearing to a trial, the court concluded that under
the circumstances the omitted defense had been tried by implied consent
and, since the non-movant should have raised the matter in the trial court
but failed to do so, the deficiency had been waived. 72 Accordingly, the court
held that the defense omitted from the pleading, but supported by summary
judgment motion and proof, was a proper basis for the trial court's judg-
ment.73 Chapin & Chapin, Inc. v. Texas Sand & Gravel Co.,74 the second
decision of the supreme court in this area, held that the affirmative defense of
payment, when asserted in response to a suit on a sworn account, did not
have to be verified in order for evidence supporting the defense to be admit-
ted at trial.75
clarified that former rule 13 does not apply to a nonparty. See Texas Att'y General's Office of
America v. Adams, 793 S.W.2d 771, 775 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, no writ). Under rule
13, the trial court may impose sanctions against the offending party which include disallow-
ance of further discovery, assessment of discovery expenses or taxable costs, establishment of
designated facts, refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose claims or de-
fenses, striking pleadings, dismissal of claims, rendition of a default judgment, and contempt.
See TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(2)(b) (miscellaneous sanctions); TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(2)(b)(6)
(contempt).
67. 815 S.W.2d 884 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi, Sept. 5, 1991, n.w.h.).
68. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S.Ct. 2447, 2461 (1990).
69. 815 S.W.2d at 888-89. It should be noted that the court in P.N.L., Inc. v. Owens, a
case also decided during the Survey period, assumed without discussion that the "abuse of
discretion" standard was applicable in appellate review of a ruling under rule 13. P.N.L., Inc.
v. Owens, 799 S.W.2d 439, 441 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, no writ). See generally W. Wendell
Hall, Standards of Appellate Review in Civil Appeals, 21 ST. MARY'S L. J. 805, 934-35 (1990)
(discussing "abuse of discretion" standard of appellate review in Texas).
70. 813 S.W.2d 492 (Tex. 1991).
71. TEX. R. Civ. P. 94. The rule provides that:
In a pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively accord
and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, contributory negli-
gence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud,
illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, res judicata,
statute of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting
an avoidance or affirmative defense. (emphasis added).
72. 813 S.W.2d at 495.
73. Id. at 495-96.
74. 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 822 (Sept. 18, 1991) (per curiam).
75. Id. at 822; see also Gayne v. Dual-Air, Inc., 600 S.W.2d 373, 375 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ) (failure to file properly sworn affidavit does not preclude
assertion of affirmative defense); Wauson & Williams, Architects, Inc. v. Reeder Dev. Corp.,
572 S.W.2d 24, 26 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, no writ) (affirmative defense
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Although arising in a pleadings context, the decision of the Dallas court of
appeals in United Marketing Technology, Inc. v. First USA Merchant Serv-
ices, Inc. 76 may have broader implications. A local rule of the trial court
provided that "no amendment to a pleading shall be filed less than fourteen
(14) days prior to the date a case is set for trial."'77 In obedience to this rule,
the trial court struck the plaintiff's amended pleading that had been filed
eleven days before a summary judgment hearing, quite properly construing
such hearing as a trial within the meaning of its local rule.78 Pointing to
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 63, 7 9 which allows a litigant to amend his
pleadings without leave of the trial court until seven days before the date of
trial, the court of appeals found that the local rule served to enlarge that
time period. 80 Given this inconsistency, the court of appeals invalidated the
local rule,81 finding it in violation of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 3a which
mandates that "no time period provided by these Rules may be altered by
local rules.. .. "82 The court of appeals reversed the action of the trial court
in striking the amended pleading, concluding that the trial court improperly
enforced the invalid rule. 83
VI. PARTIES
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 6084 sets forth the procedure under which a
nonparty may intervene in a suit. Under rule 60 an intervenor is not re-
quired to secure the trial court's permission prior to intervening in a suit;
instead, any party opposing the intervention has the burden to challenge the
intervention by a motion to strike. 85 Central Mutual Insurance Co. v. Dun-
ker 86 concerned a situation where a party sought to take advantage of the
liberal intervention practice under rule 60 but, despite the lack of an objec-
tion to such action, found it was too late in doing so. Following entry of a
final judgment against its insured, an insurer attempted to intervene in the
suit and moved to set aside the judgment, arguing the judgment was an out-
may be asserted without sworn denial if properly plead); Swisher-Orrison Co. v. W.E. Rogers
& Son, 69 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1934, no writ).
76. 812 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied).
77. Id. at 610; DALLAS CIVIL DIST. CT. R. 1.9(a) (Vernon 1986).
78. Id. at 610; accord Goswami v. Metropolitan Say. & Loan Ass'n, 751 S.W.2d 487, 490
(Tex. 1988); Love v. Sneed, 802 S.W.2d 422, 423 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, no writ); Energo
Int'l Corp. v. Modern Indust. Heating, Inc., 722 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no
writ); Claude Regis Vargo Enter., Inc. v. Bacarisse, 578 S.W.2d 524, 529 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Mainland Say. Ass'n v. Wilson, 545 S.W.2d 491,
493 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ); Bruce v. McAdoo, 531 S.W.2d 354,
356 (Tex. Civ. App.-E! Paso 1975, no writ); Jones v. Houston Materials Co., 477 S.W.2d 694,
695 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, no writ); Leche v. Stautz, 386 S.W.2d 872,
873 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
79. TEX. R. Civ. P. 63.
80. 812 S.W.2d at 610-11.
81. Id. at 611.
82. TEX. R. Civ. P. 3a(2).
83. 812 S.W.2d at 611.
84. TEX. R. Civ. P. 60.
85. Id.
86. 799 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
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growth of a "sham trial."'8 7 The trial court denied the insurer's motion on
its merits and the insurer appealed from the ruling.88 Despite the lack of any
objection to its status, the court of appeals held that, since a final judgment
had been entered prior to the insurer's intervention, the intervention was
untimely.89 As a result, the court concluded that the insurer was not a party
to the suit and, therefore, could not appeal the judgment.90
VII. DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES
The use of a retired or visiting judge to hear pretrial matters or to preside
over trials has generated its own body of case law in the disqualification
area.91 The legislature amended the Texas Government Code in 1991 to
permit a litigant to disqualify an "assigned" judge, provided an objection is
filed before the first hearing or trial over which the assigned judge is to pre-
side.92 In Ramey v. Littlejohn 93 the judge assigned to the case was an active
judge who regularly presided in the district where the suit was pending; and
one of the litigants sought to disqualify her through resort to the statute.
Resisting the disqualification, the opposing party argued that the statute
only applied to "visiting judges." Nevertheless, reading the provision liter-
ally, the appellate court ordered that the judge be disqualified, pointing out
that the statute made no distinction between "assigned" visiting judges and
"assigned" local judges.94
VIII. VENUE
Under the venue scheme established in 1983, 95 a plaintiff facing a motion
to transfer venue need only present prima facie evidence of disputed venue
facts; 96 rule 87 does not permit the trial court to resolve any factual disputes
87. Id. at 336.
88. Id.
89. Id.; accord First Alief Bank v. White, 682 S.W.2d 251, 252 (Tex. 1984); Highlands
Ins. Co. v. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 794 S.W.2d 600, 604 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no
writ); Express-News Corp. v. Spears, 766 S.W.2d 885, 888 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989,
orig. proceeding [leave denied]).
90. 799 S.W.2d at 336-37.
91. See, e.g., Kellogg v. Martin, 810 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, no writ)
(oral objection to assigned judge insufficient to disqualify judge); Brown v. Mulanax, 808
S.W.2d 718 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1991, no writ) (objection filed one hour prior to opening of
proceeding was timely); Meuth v. Hartgrove, 811 S.W.2d 626, 628 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990,
writ denied) (objection to assignment properly overruled where judge was not assigned by the
presiding judge of the administrative region); Lewis v. Leftwich, 775 S.W.2d 848 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1989, no writ) (objection is filed when tendered to the clerk, regardless of whether the
judge is aware of its filing or not); Money v. Jones, 766 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989,
writ denied) (objection filed after motion for continuance made and ruled upon was untimely).
92. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 74.053(c) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
93. 803 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, no writ).
94. 803 S.W.2d at 873.
95. See Act of June 17, 1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 385, § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2119,
2119-2124 [now codified at TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.001-15.100 (Vernon
1986)].
96. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 87(3)(c) (trial court required to deny motion to transfer venue
where plaintiff makes prima facie proof that venue is proper in county of suit).
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raised by opposing venue affidavits of the parties.97 An appellate court, on
the other hand, is required to consider the entire record, including the trial
on the merits, in determining whether venue was proper. 98 Addressing one
of the dilemmas posed by these seemingly incongruous rules, the court in
Humphrey v. May99 held that a jury finding on disputed evidence does not
control over a trial court's earlier venue ruling made in accordance with rule
87.100
In reaching this decision, the Humphrey court wrestled with the language
of section 15.064(b) of the venue statute. 10 1 Given a literal interpretation,
section 15.064(b) would permit appellate courts to "second guess" every
venue decision by a trial court on the basis of evidence that was not available
to the trial court when it made its decision. To avoid this result, the court in
Humphrey speculated that the provision mandating appellate review of the
"entire record" was designed only to 'prevent a plaintiff's "fraud, negligence
and exaggeration" as to venue facts that might not be discoverable until after
a trial on the merits.'1 0 2 Despite this observation, the Humphrey court hesi-
tated to fashion any hard and fast rule of general application. Instead, the
court limited its decision to the specific facts of the case, and expressed no
opinion on the extent to which a jury's verdict may be considered, under
different circumstances, in reviewing a venue decision.103
Conoco, Inc. v. Ruiz1°4 involved venue issues arising from a plaintiff's
third suit against the same defendant. Plaintiff's original suit, filed in Harris
County, was dismissed as a sanction for discovery abuse. Plaintiff filed a
second suit in Zapata County shortly before the dismissal of the first suit.
Although the defendant filed a motion to transfer venue of this suit to Harris
County, the trial court dismissed the second suit for non-prosecution before
ruling on the motion to transfer. When the plaintiff's representative subse-
quently filed a third lawsuit in yet another county, the defendant again re-
sponded by filing a motion to transfer venue.
On appeal, the defendant argued that venue of the third suit was fixed in
Harris County by virtue of the dismissal of plaintiff's two earlier suits. As
the defendant correctly pointed out, numerous decisions under the pre-ex-
isting venue statute and rules had held that venue was fixed in the county
named in a plea of privilege105 whenever a plaintiff nonsuited his action
97. TEX. R. Civ. P. 87; Humphrey v. May, 804 S.W.2d 328, 329 (Tex. App.-Austin
1991, writ denied).
98. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.064(b) (Vernon 1986).
99. 804 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, writ denied).
100. Id. at 330.
101. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.064(b) (Vernon 1986) provides, in perti-
nent part, that "[i]n determining whether venue was or was not proper, the appellate court
shall consider the entire record, including the trial on the merits."
102. 804 S.W.2d at 330 (citing Dan R. Price, New Texas Venue Statute: Legislative History,
15 ST. MARY's L. J. 855, 874 (1984).
103. 804 S.W.2d at 330.
104. 818 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. App.-San Antonio, September 25, 1991, writ requested).
105. Prior to their amendment in 1983, the rules of procedure governing venue hearings
provided for the filing of a "plea of privilege" as the procedural mechanism for challenging a
plaintiff's choice of venue. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 93, 120a, 385, 527 (1983).
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before the trial court made its venue determination. i 6 Further, as the Co-
noco court itself acknowledged, this "venue fixing" policy continued to apply
notwithstanding the 1983 amendments to the venue statute and rules.1
0 7
Nevertheless, the court disagreed with the defendant's contention, conclud-
ing that the "venue-fixing" rule applies only when a plaintiff voluntarily dis-
misses his suit.108 According to the court, neither a dismissal for lack of
prosecution nor a dismissal for discovery abuse is voluntary. 1° 9 Therefore,
venue of the suit was not fixed in Harris County simply by virtue of the
dismissal of plaintiff's two earlier actions. 110
Nevertheless, the court held that defendant's motion to transfer venue
should have been granted."' Plaintiff alleged that venue of the third suit
was proper in Staff County because the defendant, a corporation, main-
tained an agent who was employed in Starr County. 12 Plaintiff failed to
introduce any evidence, however, that the agent resided in Starr County. 113
Moreover, plaintiff's evidence demonstrated, at best, that the alleged agent
was only empowered to order pre-approved supplies of minimal value.
Holding that the venue provision in question applied only when an agent
possessing broad powers from the defendant resided in the county of suit,
the court concluded that plaintiff had failed to make prima facie proof of the
required venue facts.14
Pursuant to rule 87,115 the party who files a motion to transfer venue has
the duty to request a setting on the motion. The rule also provides that each
party is entitled to at least forty-five days notice of the venue hearing, except
on leave of court. 16 According to the Texas supreme court in Henderson v.
O'Neill,117 a party may obtain relief by mandamus for a violation of this
mandatory notice requirement. "s Significantly, the trial court in Henderson
made its venue determination immediately before addressing the plaintiff's
Complementing the legislature's 1983 overhaul of the Texas venue statute, Act of June 17,
1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 385 § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2119, 2119-24 [now codified at TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.001-.100 (Vernon 1986)], the Texas supreme court
promulgated amended procedural rules in 1983 that eliminated all references to the plea of
privilege. See Order of June 15, 1983, reprinted at 46 TEX. B.J. 858-59 (1983)(special tear-out
section).
106. See, e.g., Royal Petroleum Corp. v. McCallum, 134 Tex. 543, 135 S.W.2d 958, 967
(1940); Wilson v. Wilson, 601 S.W.2d 104, 105 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
107. 818 S.W.2d at 123; see also Hendrick Medical Ctr. v. Howell, 690 S.W.2d 42 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1985, no writ), discussed in 1986 Annual Survey, supra note 3, at 501-02.
108. 818 S.W.2d at 123.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 127.
112. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.036 (Vernon 1986) provides that "[a] suit
against a private corporation . . . may be brought in the county . . . in which the plaintiff
resided ... provided the corporation ... has an agency or representative in the county ......
113. 818 S.W.2d at 127.
114. Id. at 126 (citing Milligan v. Southern Express, Inc., 151 Tex. 315, 250 S.W.2d 194,
198 (1952)).
115. TEX. R. Civ. P. 87(1).
116. Id.
117. 797 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. 1990).
118. Id. at 905.
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request for injunctive relief, which the trial court was presumably required
to hear well before the forty-five day period could have elapsed. Unfortu-
nately, the opinion in Henderson provides trial courts with no guidance as to
how they should proceed in these circumstances. In addition, the trial court
had apparently "acknowledged" that the timing of its hearing was a devia-
tion from the required procedure. 119 At least arguably, therefore, the hear-
ing was expedited with "leave of court." The supreme court did not address
this possibility, however, in deciding that the trial court had failed to comply
with the rule's notice requirements.120
Courts in other cases have held, like Henderson, that mandamus is avail-
able to correct trial court's decisions regarding venue. For example, manda-
mus will always lie to correct a void order on venue.' 21 Cone v. Gregory122
reiterated the general rule, however, that appellate courts will not issue man-
damus simply to correct an erroneous venue decision. 123
IX. LIMITATIONS
Conoco, Inc. v. Ruiz 124 involved the tolling effect of incompetency on the
applicable statute of limitations. Ruiz timely filed a suit for personal injury
accusing Conoco of negligence. By the time that suit was dismissed for dis-
covery abuse, Ruiz had already filed another suit against Conoco. The trial
court also dismissed this second suit for lack of prosecution. In the
meantime, a court in an unrelated proceeding determined that Ruiz had
been incompetent since the date of his accident, and appointed Ruiz' wife as
his guardian. Following this appointment, Ruiz's wife filed yet a third suit
against Conoco claiming damages for Ruiz' injuries. Because the guardian
filed this latter suit more than five years after Ruiz's accident, however, Co-
noco alleged that the suit was barred by limitations. 125 The guardian re-
sponded that the two-year statute of limitations had been tolled due to
Ruiz's incompetency.
On appeal, Conoco contended that Texas' tolling provision 126 was in-
tended to protect only those who did not have access to the courts during the
period of their legal disability. According to Conoco, therefore, the tolling
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See Dorchester Master Ltd. Partnership v. Anthony, 734 S.W.2d 151, 152 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987) (orig. proceeding) (trial court had no authority to consider
second venue motion).
122. 814 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, orig. proceeding [leave
denied]).
123. Id. at 414.
124. 818 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. App.-San Antonio, September 25, 1991, writ requested).
125. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003(a) (Vernon 1986) requires a party
suing for personal injury to bring his suit not later than two years after the cause of action
accrued.
126. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.001(a) (Vernon Supp. 1991) provides, in
pertinent part: "For the purposes of this subchapter, a person is under a legal disability if the
person is: ... (2) of unsound mind." If a person is under a legal disability when the cause of




statute did not apply because Ruiz had access to the courts after the acci-
dent, as evidenced by his filing of two prior lawsuits. Although the court of
appeals agreed with Conoco that the purpose of the tolling provision was to
suspend limitations only for those who lacked access to the courts,1 27 it con-
cluded that the guardian could take advantage of the tolling statute despite
Ruiz' filing of the two earlier lawsuits. 128 The court held that the tolling
provision expressly preserves causes of action for those who, because of
mental incompetency, are unable to protect their legal right to sue.' 29 Be-
cause Ruiz was of unsound mind at all times subsequent to the accident,
Ruiz had no opportunity to protect his legal rights until a guardian was
appointed for him. 130
A different type of tolling provision was at issue in Vale v. Ryan. 13' The
Texas savings statute 32 permits a plaintiff who has timely filed a claim for
relief in one court to refile-that claim in a second court if: (1) the first suit is
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and (2) the second suit is commenced
within sixty days after the first suit's dismissal becomes final. 133 The plaintiff
in Vale originally sued in federal court asserting a violation of her civil rights
and several pendent state law claims. Although the federal court dismissed
all of the plaintiff's claims against one defendant with prejudice, it refused to
sever those claims from plaintiff's claims against the other defendants. 134
Therefore, plaintiff could not appeal the dismissal for several years. In the
meantime, plaintiff filed a state court lawsuit against the defendant asserting
the same causes of action that she had asserted as pendent claims in the
federal suit. Plaintiff did not file this second suit, however, until more than
sixty days after the federal court entered its order of dismissal. As a result,
the trial court in the state lawsuit granted summary judgment in defendant's
favor on the basis of limitations.
The court of appeals reversed the judgment, concluding that the savings
statute operated to toll limitations during the pendency of plaintiff's appeal
from the federal court's order of dismissal. 135 Although plaintiff did not
bring her state court suit until approximately five months after the trial
court's order of dismissal, that order was notfinal within the meaning of the
savings statute until plaintiff's appeal of the order was decided. 136 The
court, therefore, held that plaintiff complied with the sixty-day requirement
of the savings statute by filing her state court lawsuit before the Fifth Circuit
issued a ruling. 137 The court of appeals also rejected defendants' alternative
argument that the savings statute did not apply to the federal court's order
127. 818 S.W.2d at 121.
128. Id. at 122.
129. Id. at 121.
130. Id. at 122.
131. 809 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, no writ).
132. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.064 (Vernon 1986).
133. Id.
134. 809 S.W.2d at 325.
135. Id. at 327.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 326-27.
1992] 1389
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
of dismissal because it was not predicated on a lack of jurisdiction.' 38 The
court ruled that the order of dismissal constituted a dismissal for "lack of
jurisdiction," even though the federal court had merely declined to consider
the pendent claims as a matter of discretion.139 According to the court of
appeals, plaintiff was ultimately denied the right to litigate her claims in
federal court, and "[t]he effect of the order as one of dismissal for want of
jurisdiction cannot be obviated by means of nomenclature."'140
Finally, in Eckerdt v. Frostex Foods, Inc. 141 the Austin court of appeals
held that the one-year deadline established by the Texas Commission on
Human Rights Act 142 for bringing suits alleging sex discrimination does not
violate due process.' 43 In an earlier opinion, 44 the court had held that this
deadline was jurisdictional, and that the Commission's failure to send timely
notice of a right to sue did not toll the running of the one-year time pe-
riod.' 45 The court expanded this holding in Eckerdt by explicitly finding
that the Texas statute did not require the plaintiff to postpone the filing of
her suit until she received the right-to-sue letter.' 46 According to the court,
therefore, the dismissal of plaintiff's suit resulted from her own negligence
rather than a procedural flaw in the statute.' 47
X. DISCOVERY
A. Discovery Procedures
Rule 171 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 48 allows a court, in ex-
ceptional cases and for good cause, to appoint a special master to perform
specified tasks in the manner of a master of chancery in a court of equity. 149
The Texas supreme court outlined the applicable standards for this rarely-
used power in Simpson v. Canales.150 In Simpson, the trial court had ap-
pointed a special master to oversee discovery, conduct hearings, and make
rulings on all pre-trial discovery matters, and had ordered that the fees for
the master be apportioned between the parties.' 3 ' The supreme court
granted mandamus relief, holding that the case, while complex, was not ex-
ceptional, and that there was not good cause for a blanket referral of all
138. Id. at 327.
139. Vale, 809 S.W.2d at 327.
140. Id. (quoting Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 186 S.W.2d 306, 318 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1944, writ ref'd w.o.m.)).
141. 802 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ).
142. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7.01(a) (Vernon 1987).
143. 802 S.W.2d at 72.
144. Green v. Aluminum Co. of America, 760 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. App.-Austin 1988, no
writ).
145. Id. at 380.
146. 802 S.W. 2d at 72.
147. Id.
148. TEX. R. Civ. P. 171.
149. Id.
150. 806 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. 1991).
151. Id. at 804-05.
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discovery matters to a special master. 152 Acknowledging the paucity of
Texas case law on the use of masters, 153 the court looked to federal law in
concluding that the requirement of an "exceptional case" is not satisfied
merely because the case is complex or time-consuming, or because the trial
court is busy.154
Two decisions of note during the Survey period emphasized that the per-
missible forms of discovery in Texas are limited to those set forth in rule
166b(l). 155 In Amis v. Ashworth 156 the court held that a party was not enti-
tled under rules 166b(2)(c) 157 and 167158 to obtain access to the property of
his opponent for purposes of creating a videotaped reenactment of the events
giving rise to the lawsuit.' 5 9 The court stated, however, that it should not be
understood as prohibiting the entry onto the opposing party's property for
purposes of photographing the existing conditions and thereafter recreating
them at another site.160 Similarly, in Moore v. Wood 161 the court rejected an
expansive view of the forms of discovery, as opposed to the scope of discov-
ery, in holding that a personal injury plaintiff could not be compelled to
submit to an examination by a vocational rehabilitation specialist, who was
neither a doctor nor a psychologist. 162
Two cases decided during the survey period provide guidance on the
proper manner of producing documents in discovery. The San Antonio
court of appeals held that the trial court erred in allowing the plaintiffs ac-
cess to their opponent's files to search for discoverable documents in Texaco,
Inc. v. Dominguez.163 Notwithstanding the plaintiffs' concern that the de-
fendant might be overlooking responsive documents in its own review of the
files, the court concluded that the rules of discovery were promulgated to
prevent just such a "fishing expedition."' 164 In Steenbergen v. Ford Motor
Co. 165 the appellate court found no error in the trial court's order allowing
the defendant to produce the documents it had collected over the years relat-
ing to the absence of passive restraint systems in its vehicles in a "reading
room" set up in its Michigan headquarters. 166
152. Id. at 812. The court concluded that mandamus was appropriate because limiting the
parties to their remedy on appeal would deny them any effective relief. Id.
153. Id. at 805.
154. 806 S.W.2d at 811 (citing La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957)). The
court's opinion also includes an extended discussion of the office of a master in chancery at
common law. Id. at 806-08. Justice Mauzy, in a separate concurrence, found this discussion of
history inappropriate. Id. at 812 (Mauzy, J., concurring).
155. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(l).
156. 802 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1990, orig. proceeding [leave denied]).
157. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(c).
158. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167.
159. Amis, 802 S.W.2d at 376-77. The court noted that the question before it was entirely
different from the question of whether a videotaped reenactment, made without having entered
onto the property of another, is properly admissible in evidence. Id. at 377.
160. Id.
161. 809 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, orig. proceeding).
162. Id. at 623-24.
163. 812 S.W.2d 451, 456 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, orig. proceeding).
164. Id. at 455-56.
165. 814 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. App.-Dallas, June 18, 1991, writ requested).
166. Id. at 758-59.
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Rule 188(1)167 permits a deposition in another state to be taken before a
person who has been authorized, either under the law of Texas or the other
state, to administer oaths at the location at which the examination is held. 1 68
The court in Clone Computer Distributors of America, Inc. v. State of
Texas 169 interpreted this provision as permitting a telephone deposition of
an out-of-state witness to be taken by a court reporter located in Texas. 170
The court concluded that the deponent in such a situation is in the vocal and
aural presence of the court reporter, thereby satisfying the requirement of
rule 188(1)171 that the deposition be taken "before" the person administering
the oath.' 72 The court also rejected the defendants' argument that physical
presence is required so that the court reporter will be able to identify the
person who was sworn, stating that in the deposition context, the witness
takes a second oath before a notary public when he or she signs the
deposition. 173
B. Privileges and Exemptions
The Texas supreme court answered the question of how long the attorney
work product privilege endures in Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Cald-
well.' 74 The court held that the underlying purpose of the work product
privilege would be totally defeated if the privilege were limited to documents
prepared in the particular case in which discovery was sought. 75 Moreover,
the court expressed the view that a party that is a repeat litigant must be
allowed to develop an overall legal strategy for all of the cases in which it is
involved. 176
The decision in Owens-Corning was also significant for its holding that the
work product privilege was not waived by the assertion of a state-of-the-art
defense, which the supreme court viewed not as a true affirmative defense,
but rather as a description of Owens-Corning's rebuttal evidence.' 77 Thus,
the court held that the rule of Ginsberg v. Fifth Court of Appeals 178 prohibit-
ing the offensive assertion of a privilege was not implicated.' 79
167. TEX. R. Civ. P. 188(1).
168. Id.
169. 819 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. App.-Dallas, October 21, 1991, n.w.h.) (to be reported at 819
S.W.2d 593).
170. Id. at 598.
171. TEX. R. Civ. P. 188(1).
172. 819 S.W.2d at 598. Interestingly, the court noted that the appellants did not challenge
the authority of the court reporter to administer oaths. Id. Therefore the court did not have
to address the question of whether the reporter had to be authorized to administer oaths in the
state where the witness was located.
173. Id. at 599. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 205. The court suggested that if the deposition is not
signed a motion to suppress might be appropriate. 819 S.W.2d at 599.
174. 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 89 (November 6, 1991).
175. Id. at 90.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 91-92.
178. 686 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. 1985).
179. 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 92. See also Dossey v. Salazar, 808 S.W.2d 146, 147-48 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, orig. proceeding [leave denied])(plaintiffs not entitled to
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Under rule 166b(4),180 the party seeking to exclude documents from dis-
covery on the basis of a privilege or exemption has the burden of supporting
such claim with affidavits or testimony. 8 1 The trial court must then deter-
mine if an in camera inspection of some or all of the documents is neces-
sary.18 2 In State v. Lowry' 83 the supreme court held that the trial court
abused its discretion in failing to conduct an in camera examination of citi-
zen complaint letters compiled by the Attorney General's office through pre-
suit civil investigative demands when those materials were later sought in
discovery by the defendants in an antitrust action brought by the state.18 4
In Enron Oil & Gas Co. v. Flores,18 5 on the other hand, the court held that it
was not an abuse of discretion to order the production, without prior in
camera review, of documents allegedly containing trade secrets.' 8 6 The
court reasoned that the trial judge could have reasonably determined that
the documents themselves would not have assisted him in making his
decision. '8 7
Finally, the significance of a party's designation of experts was the subject
of two noteworthy cases during the survey period. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co. v. Blackmon 188 stands for the proposition that the mere designation of a
person as an expert witness does not automatically waive any privilege that
might otherwise attach to communications with that person. 18 9 However,
any privileges that might be asserted as to specific matters the expert relied
upon as a basis for his testimony are, of course, waived. 19 In Enserch Corp.
v. Crowley 191 the court distinguished two recent supreme court decisions 192
in holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in preventing the
defendant from obtaining discovery of documents in the possession of an
expert hired in anticipation of litigation, where the plaintiffs had not yet
designated which of their experts would testify. 193
C. Duty to Supplement Discovery
As in prior years, numerous decisions during the survey period addressed
defendant's mental health and medical records merely to try to gain evidence that defendant
was driving under the influence of alcohol at time of accident that was subject of suit).
180. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(4).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. 802 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. 1991).
184. Id. at 674. See also Northeast Community Hosp. v. Gregg, 815 S.W.2d 320, 327 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1991, no writ) (trial court abused discretion in failing to review tendered
hospital peer review documents in camera).
185. 810 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, orig. proceeding [leave denied]).
186. Id. at 413.
187. Id.
188. 810 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, orig. proceeding).
189. Id. at 440.
190. Id.
191. 800 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, orig. proceeding [leave denied]).
192. See Tom L. Scott, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. 1990); Axelson, Inc. v.
McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. 1990).
193. 800 S.W.2d at 686.
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the duty to supplement discovery responses imposed by rules 166b(6) 194 and
215(5).195 The supreme court once again led the way, exhorting the lower
courts to take literally the rule that a witness whose identity is not timely
provided in response to interrogatories may not be permitted to testify ab-
sent a showing of good cause. 196 For example, the supreme court held in
Alvarado v. Farah Manufacturing Co. 197 that a plaintiff cannot avoid the
sanction of exclusion merely by designating the undisclosed witness as a re-
buttal witness, at least where he has reason to know prior to trial that such
witness's testimony may be needed. 198 Similarly, the court disapproved of
the Austin court of appeals' decision in Jamail v. Anchor Mortgage Services,
Inc.,199 a case cited in the 1991 Annual Survey, which had held that the
admission of the testimony of an undisclosed corporate representative of the
defendant regarding lending regulations was not error, because he was not a
person with knowledge of facts relating directly to plaintiff's cause of ac-
tion. 2°° The supreme court rejected the fine distinction drawn by the lower
court in favor of a straight-forward interpretation of rule 166b(2)(d), 20'
which states that "[a] person has knowledge of relevant facts when he or she
has or may have knowledge of any discoverable matter. '202 Because the
defendant's representative had knowledge of his employee's mortgage lend-
ing practices, he was within the scope of plaintiff's interrogatory. 20 3
The Amarillo court of appeals held in Smith v. Southwest Feed Yards,
Ltd.204 that the defendant could not testify where he failed to list himself as
a person with knowledge of relevant facts in response to plaintiff's interroga-
tories.205 In doing so, the court declined to follow two decisions of another
court of appeals that reached a contrary result.2 6 The court rejected de-
fendant's argument that good cause existed for allowing the testimony that
was based upon, among other things, the fact that the defendant notified
plaintiff seven days prior to trial of his intent to appear as a witness, in ac-
cordance with the trial court's pretrial order. 207
194. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(6).
195. TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(5).
196. Id.; Alvarado v. Farah Mfg. Co., 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 107, 108-09 (November 21,
1990); Jamail v. Anchor Mortgage Services, Inc., 797 S.W.2d 369, 375 (Tex. App.-Austin
1990), writ denied per curiam, 809 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. 1991).
197. 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 107 (November 21, 1990).
198. Id. at 109. In its opinion in Alvarado, the court chronicled its decisions over the last
six years on this subject, in each of which it rejected the reasons proffered as good cause for the
late designation of a witness, as if to signal exasperation at having to reiterate the standard so
many times. Id. at 108-09.
199. 797 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990), writ denied per curiam, 809 S.W.2d 221
(Tex. 1991).
200. Id. at 375.
201. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(d).
202. Id.; Jamail, 809 S.W.2d at 223.
203. Id.
204. 811 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. App.-Amarillo, June 18, 1991, writ requested).
205. Id. at 721.
206. Id. at 720-21. In Henry S. Miller Co. v. Bynum, 797 S.W.2d 51, 57 (Tex. App.-
Houston [ist Dist.] 1990, writ granted) and NCL Studs, Inc. v. Jandl, 792 S.W.2d 182, 185(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied) the court reached a contrary result.
207. 811 S.W.2d at 721.
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The Texas courts also addressed certain procedural issues raised by the
duty to supplement during the past year. In Ticor Title Insurance Co. v.
Lacy,208 the supreme court stated that a party may rely on a co-party's inter-
rogatories to their common opponent and may object to the testimony of an
undisclosed expert, even if the party who propounded the interrogatories
does not. 2°9 In Service Lloyds Insurance Co. v. Harbison,210 the high court
held that the designation of an expert witness was timely, without a showing
of good cause, where the trial court overruled the defendant's objection to
plaintiff's expert witness interrogatory and directed the defendant to answer
such interrogatory within thirty days of trial.211 The court in Jones v.
Kinder212 held that verification of a supplemental answer to interrogatories
is not necessary, and the lack of a verification did not require the exclusion
of an expert witness identified in such supplemental answer.213 Finally, one
court of appeals held in two cases that a trial court's order granting or deny-
ing a pretrial motion to strike the designation of an expert witness as un-
timely is not subject to mandamus. 214
While good cause for allowing the testimony of an untimely-designated
witness may be difficult to establish, several cases decided during the Survey
period demonstrate that it is not impossible. 215 For example, where a party
loses the services of its expert witness shortly before trial through no fault of
its own, the court may properly allow a new expert to be designated and to
testify.216 Similarly, one court has held that where the self-proving affidavit
of a will was struck at trial, the party offering the will was entitled to call a
witness to its execution to testify, despite the fact that the witness had not
been previously identified in response to interrogatories. 217 And in a case
involving the failure to supplement the production of documents, First Inter-
State Bank of Bedford v. Bland,218 the court found that good cause existed
for the admission of photographs that were not taken until immediately
prior to trial.219
208. 803 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. 1991).
209. Id. at 266; see also Ward v. O'Connor, 816 S.W.2d 446, 447 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1991, no writ) (identification of fact and expert witnesses in response to one defendant's inter-
rogatories was disclosure of same information to all, especially where supplementation was
obviously intended for all pending discovery).
210. 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 95 (November 6, 1991).
211. Id. at 97.
212. 807 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1991, no writ).
213. Id. at 872-73.
214. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Sanderson, 810 S.W.2d 485, 487 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
1991, orig. proceeding); City of Port Arthur v. Sanderson, 810 S.W.2d 476, 477 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont 1991, orig. proceeding).
215. Wells v. HCA Health Services of Texas, Inc. 806 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1991, writ denied); Broach v. Bradley, 800 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1991,
writ denied); First Interstate Bank of Bedford v. Bland, 810 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1991, no writ).
216. Wells, 806 S.W.2d at 852-53.
217. Broach, 800 S.W.2d at 679.
218. 810 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, no writ).
219. Id. at 288; see also Black v. Texas Dep't of Labor & Standards, 816 S.W.2d 496, 499
(Tex. App.-Texarkana, Aug. 20, 1991, writ requested) (allowing introduction of list of claims




Probably the most significant discovery cases during the Survey period
were two supreme court decisions, TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v.
Powell220 and Braden v. Downey,221 which sharply limited the scope of a
trial court's discretion in imposing severe sanctions against a party for dis-
covery abuse. In the wake of these decisions, the continued validity of nu-
merous cases decided over the last several years, which emphasized
deference to the trial court's determination of an appropriate sanction, must
be strongly questioned.
In TransAmerican the trial court struck the plaintiff's pleadings and dis-
missed its action as a sanction for the failure of its president to appear at a
deposition, and the court of appeals denied the plaintiff's petition for a writ
of mandamus. 222 The plaintiff fared better in the supreme court, however,
which held that the imposition of the ultimate sanction of dismissal was not
"just" within the meaning of rule 215.223 The court established a two-part
test for determining the appropriateness of discovery sanctions. 224 First,
there must be a direct relationship between the objectionable conduct and
the sanction to be imposed.225 Therefore, the sanction must both target the
abuse and attempt to remedy the prejudice to the innocent party.226 Fur-
ther, the sanction should be imposed upon the offender, and the trial court
must try to determine to whom the offensive conduct is attributable: the
party, counsel, or both. 227
The second aspect of the test enunciated by the supreme court is that the
sanction imposed must not be excessive in relation to the wrongful con-
duct.228 A discovery sanction should be no more severe than necessary to
fulfill its legitimate purposes.229 Moreover, courts must consider the availa-
bility of less severe sanctions and whether lesser sanctions would serve the
goal of promoting compliance with the discovery rules. 230
Finally, having defined the boundaries of a trial court's discretion under
rule 215,231 the supreme court went on to note that the imposition of very
severe sanctions is limited not only by the foregoing standards, but also by
constitutional due process.232 Thus, the court held that "[d]iscovery sanc-
tions cannot be used to adjudicate the merits of a party's claims or defenses
unless a party's hindrance of the discovery process justifies a presumption
220. 811 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. 1991).
221. 811 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. 1991).
222. 811 S.W.2d at 915-16.
223. Id. at 919. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(2)(b) and (3).





229. 811 S.W.2d at 917.
230. Id.
231. TEX. R. Civ. P. 215.
232. 811 S.W.2d at 917.
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that its claims or defenses lack merit." 233 The court noted, however, that a
party's refusal to produce material evidence, despite the imposition of lesser
sanctions, would entitle the trial court to presume that a claim or defense
lacked merit and to dispose of it through the imposition of sanctions. 234
The supreme court undertook a similar analysis in Braden, holding that
the trial court abused its discretion in requiring the payment of severe mone-
tary sanctions and performance of community service before such sanctions
could be properly appealed. 235 Citing TransAmerican, which was decided
the same day, the court stated that monetary sanctions likewise should not
ordinarily be used to dispose of litigation.236 Accordingly, if the monetary
sanction imposed is so severe that it threatens a party's continuation of the
litigation, an adequate remedy on appeal is assured only if payment of the
sanction is deferred until a final judgment is rendered. 237 The court then
adopted the procedure established by the Fifth Circuit in Thomas v. Capital
Security Services, Inc.,238 a rule 11239 case, which requires a trial court that
imposes monetary sanctions to either (1) provide that the sanction is paya-
ble only upon final judgment, or (2) make express written findings, after a
prompt hearing, as to why the sanction does not have the effect of precluding
access to the courts.24°
The intermediate appellate courts appear to be uncertain about how to
implement this new mandate from the supreme court. On one hand, the
court in Jaques v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association241 reversed the
imposition of a dismissal sanction where the appellant had ignored a trial
court order to answer interrogatories. 242 The court read TransAmerican to
require imposition of lesser sanctions first, stating that the trial court could
have ordered compliance a second time and threatened the "death penalty"
consequence if it was ignored again.243 In McConnell v. Memorial Construc-
tion Co. 244 the same court of appeals upheld a trial court's order striking the
defendant's pleadings as a sanction for his failure to file a status report or
appear at a status conference. 245 The majority based its decision on the au-
thority of Koslow's v. Mackie,246 but the dissent argued that the standards set
233. Id. at 918.
234. Id.
235. Braden, 811 S.W.2d at 929-30. Significantly, the court specifically noted that it did
not criticize the creative sanction of requiring a party's attorney to perform community ser-
vice. Id. at 930.
236. Id. at 929.
237. Id.
238. 836 F.2d 866 (5th Cir. 1988).
239. FED. R. Civ. P. 11
240. 836 F.2d at 882-83 n.23; Braden, 811 S.W.2d at 929.
241. 816 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1991, no writ)
242. Id. at 131.
243. Id.
244. No. 01-90-00597-CV, (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.], April 15, 1991, writ
requested).
245. Id., slip op. at 1-2.
246. 796 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. 1990) (striking pleadings and rendering default judgment are
available as sanctions within the discretion of the trial court for disobeying a pretrial order).
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out in TransAmerican should have been applied. 247 Finally, in Dempsey v.
Pfizer, Inc. ,248 the court upheld, without even mentioning TransAmerican,
the dismissal of most of the plaintiff's claims as a sanction for their destruc-
tion of evidence. 249
The supreme court decided two other procedural questions regarding
sanctions during the survey period. First, in O'Connor v. Sam Houston Med-
ical Hospital, Inc. 250 the court held that a court of appeals does not have the
power, under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 60(a), 2 5 1 to dismiss an ap-
peal as a sanction for the appellant's failure to comply with an order of the
trial court relating to post-judgment discovery. 252 Instead, the court con-
strued rule 60(a) 2 5 3 as applying only to a party's failure to comply with an
order of the court of appeals. 254 The court left open the question of whether
a court of appeals may ever properly dismiss an appeal based on such con-
duct, perhaps after the appellate court first issues its own order requiring
compliance with the trial court's order.255 In Felderhoff v. Knauf 256 the
supreme court held that a plaintiff who has taken a nonsuit is not precluded
from complaining on appeal of monetary sanctions imposed by the trial
court prior to dismissal.257
Finally, Texas courts continue to grapple with the application of the dis-
covery sanction rules in non-traditional settings. For example, in Schenck v.
Ebby Halliday Real Estate, Inc. 258 the court upheld the exclusion of the tes-
timony of defendants' expert witness, an appraiser, who trespassed on plain-
tiffs' property in order to perform his appraisal. 25 9 In Rizk v. Millard 260 on
the other hand, the court held that rule 215261 provided no authority for the
imposition of sanctions against a party for repudiating a settlement that was
allegedly reached during mediation.262
E. Miscellaneous
Every trial practitioner should take note of the Texas supreme court's de-
cision in London Market Companies v. Schattman.263 There, the defendants
attempted to show good cause for the late filing of their responses to plain-
tiffs' interrogatories and document request, arguing the existence of an al-
247. McConnell, No. 01-90-00597-CV, slip op. at 4 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
248. 813 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, no writ).
249. Id. at 208-09.
250. 807 S.W.2d 574 (Tex. 1991).
251. TEX. R. App. P. 60(a).
252. 807 S.W.2d at 576.
253. TEX. R. App. P. 60(a).
254. 807 S.W.2d at 576.
255. Id.
256. 819 S.W.2d 110 (Tex. 1991).
257. Id. at 111.
258. 803 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, no writ).
259. Id. at 372-73.
260. 810 S.W.2 318 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ).
261. TEX. R. Civ. P. 215.
262. 810 S.W.2d at 321.
263. 811 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. 1991).
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leged oral agreement with plaintiffs' counsel that they could take as much
time as they needed. The supreme court rejected this argument, reasoning
that permitting the subjective belief of only one party to constitute good
cause would undermine the purpose of rule 11,264 which is the avoidance of
disputes as to the existence or terms of such oral agreements. 265
Rule 737266 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes trial courts
to "entertain suits in the nature of bills of discovery. 267 In Ross Stores, Inc.
v. Redken Laboratories, Inc.268 the supreme court held that when a bill of
discovery is filed against a third party, against whom no further suit is con-
templated, the discovery order entered by the trial court is an end in itself
and operates as a mandatory injunction against the discovery defendant. 269
Thus, an appeal will lie from such an order.270
XI. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgment procedure was the topic of a number of decisions dur-
ing the Survey period. The most significant was Roark v. Stallworth Oil and
Gas, Inc.271 in which the Texas supreme court held that "an unpleaded af-
firmative defense may also serve as the basis for a summary judgment when
it is raised in the summary judgment motion, and the [non-movant] does not
object to the lack of... a pleading in either its written response or before the
rendition of judgment". 272 The court distinguished one of its own prior de-
cisions273 in reaching this result and disapproved of numerous conflicting
courts of appeals' opinions.274
McConnell v. Southside Independent School District275 and Roberts v.
Southwest Texas Methodist Hospital276 both involved the rule 166a(c) 277 re-
quirement that a motion for summary judgment expressly set forth the
grounds on which it is based. 278 In McConnell, the court held that this re-
quirement was satisfied when the grounds for summary judgment were set
forth in a brief that accompanied the motion.2 79 The Roberts decision
264. TEX. R. Civ. P. II (requiring agreements between counsel to be in writing, signed,
and filed with the court).
265. 811 S.W.2d at 552.
266. TEX. R. Civ. P. 737.
267. Id.
268. 810 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. 1991).
269. Id. at 742.
270. Id. Compare with Collier Services Corp. v. Salinas, 812 S.W.2d 372, 375 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1991, no writ)(post-judgment discovery orders are not final and appeal-
able, although mandamus is available to correct abuse of discretion); Pelt v. State Bd. of Ins.,
802 S.W.2d 822, 829 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, no writ)(appeal from denial of motion to quash
administrative subpoena dismissed for lack of jurisdiction).
271. 813 S.W.2d 492 (Tex. 1991).
272. Id. at 494.
273. See DeBord v. Muller, 446 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1969).
274. 813 S.W.2d at 494 n.2.
275. 814 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, writ requested)(per curiam).
276. 811 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, writ denied).
277. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(c).
278. Id.
279. 814 S.W.2d at 248.
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teaches that, although the non-movant must specially except to a summary
judgment motion that states no grounds in order to preserve that complaint
for appeal, there is no such obligation if the motion states at least one
ground.2 0 In the latter case, then, a summary judgment cannot be upheld
on grounds that were not asserted, even if the evidence supports them and
the responding party did not except to the motion.21
Rule 166a(c) 282 also requires a minimum of twenty-one days notice of a
summary judgment hearing.283 In De Los Santos v. Southwest Texas Meth-
odist Hospital284 the court held that rule 21a,28 5 which adds an additional
three days to time periods for responding when service by mail is used,286
does not require twenty-four days notice of a summary judgment hearing
when such notice is given by mail. 28 7 Summary judgment hearings were also
addressed by the Fourteenth District court of appeals in Martin v. Cohen.288
There the court held that a trial judge need not actually hold an oral hearing
on a motion for summary judgment.289 The court acknowledged that its
conclusion conflicted with the decision of another court of appeals, 29° per-
haps setting the stage for the supreme court to resolve the question.
As in prior years, the sufficiency and proper method of presenting sum-
mary judgment evidence was also the subject of a number of decisions. In
Anderson v. Snider291 the supreme court held that the affidavit of an inter-
ested expert witness, such as the defendant in a malpractice suit, can be suffi-
cient to support a summary judgment under appropriate circumstances. 292
The court concluded, however, that the defendant's affidavit in the case
before it consisted merely of incompetent legal conclusions and, as such, was
nothing more than a sworn denial of the plaintiff's claims. 293 In Continental
Savings Association v. Collins294 the court rejected the argument that rule
166a(c), 295 which forbids the introduction of oral testimony at a summary
judgment hearing,296 precluded the trial court's reliance on a stipulation
made in open court. 297
Finally, another court has adopted the procedure outlined by the Dallas
court of appeals in Deerfield Land Joint Venture v. Southern Union Realty
280. 811 S.W.2d at 145.
281. Id. at 146.
282. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(c).
283. Id.
284. 802 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, no writ).
285. TEX. R. Civ. P. 21a.
286. Id.
287. 802 S.W.2d at 754.
288. 804 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ).
289. Id. at 202-03.
290. Id. at 203, citing Williams v. Carpentier, 767 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
1989, no writ).
291. 808 S.W.2d 54 (Tex. 1991)(per curiam).
292. Id. at 55.
293. Id.
294. 814 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ).
295. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(c).
296. Id.
297. 814 S.W.2d at 833.
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Co. 298 for ensuring that depositions are properly before the court in sum-
mary judgment proceedings.299 The court in Hollingsworth v. King 300 deter-
mined that, notwithstanding the addition in 1990 of a new section to rule
166a 30 relating to the filing of discovery materials,302 authenticating the
deposition with the court reporter's certificate and, where a copy or excerpts
are used, the attorney's own affidavit remains the better practice.303 Indeed,
one court has held that the failure to properly authenticate deposition ex-
cerpts is substantive and, accordingly, can be raised for the first time on
appeal.3ta "
XII. JURY QUESTIONS
The proper manner of preserving objections to the court's charge was the
subject of several significant decisions during the survey period. American
National Petroleum Co. v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. 305 demon-
strates the necessity of clarity in objecting to the charge. In that case, the
supreme court held that defense counsel's objections to a cluster of jury
questions relating to a tortious interference claim did not include an objec-
tion to the omission of a separate question as to damages.3a 6 Indeed, the
majority viewed counsel's statement as a stipulation that a separate question
was not necessary, since the damages recoverable under the tort theory of
liability would be the same as those recoverable under the contract the-
ory. 30 7 Justice Gonzalez vigorously dissented, arguing that the majority's
interpretation of counsel's objections and statements was erroneous.308 In
the dissent's view, "[t]he unfortunate lesson to be learned from today's opin-
ion is that one should never 'agree' to anything in open court for fear that an
imperfect choice of words will be given an interpretation far beyond what
was intended. '3a°9
Trial practitioners should also note the decision in Peterson v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. 3 10 in which the Dallas court of appeals held that the defend-
ant did not preserve error with respect to the trial court's failure to submit a
question to the jury on his waiver defense. 311 Although the opinion is not
298. 758 S.W.2d 608, 610 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied).
299. Hollingsworth v. King, 810 S.W.2d 772, 773-74 (Tex. App.-Amarillo), writ denied
per curiam, 816 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1991); see also Williams v. Conroe Indep. School Dist., 809
S.W.2d 954, 957 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1991, no writ)(transcript of hearing and deposition
excerpts that were unverified were not proper summary judgment evidence).
300. 810 S.W.2d 772.
301. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a.
302. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(d) (providing for the use of unfiled discovery materials in
summary judgment practice by filing and service of appendices or notice).
303. 810 S.W.2d at 774.
304. Bixenstine v. Palacios, 805 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, no
writ).
305. 798 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. 1990).
306. Id. at 278.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 280-82 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
309. Id. at 284.
310. 805 S.W.2d 541 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, no writ).
311. Id. at 552.
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clear on this point, the defendant may have included a waiver question in the
requested charge he filed with the district clerk before the court's charge was
prepared. 312 Regardless, the court held that issues proposed for inclusion in
the charge must be tendered to the trial court after the draft charge is pre-
pared and given to the parties; the mere filing of a set of requested questions,
definitions, and instructions prior to the charge conference is insufficient to
preserve error.313
Finally, the decisions in Diamond Shamrock Refining and Marketing Co.
v. Mendez 314 and Methodist Hospitals of Dallas v. Corporate Communicators,
Inc. 315 stand for the proposition that a trial court errs in allowing objections
to be made to the charge after it is read to the jury, even if the parties con-
sent to such a procedure.3 16 Significantly, the court in the latter case noted
that the trial judge, rather than correcting the perceived error in the charge
upon objection made during closing arguments, could have properly utilized
rule 272317 by allowing the jury to retire and then, on his own motion, modi-
fying the charge, reading it to the jury, and allowing additional argument.318
XIII. JURY PRACTICE
In a decision that surprised many observers, the United States Supreme
Court held that Batson v. Kentucky,319 which prohibits the prosecution in a
criminal case from exercising its peremptory challenges to exclude prospec-
tive jurors solely on account of their race, 320 also applies to civil litigation.321
The Court reversed a decision of the Fifth Circuit court of appeals, 322 which
had held that a civil lawsuit does not involve state action. 323 The Supreme
Court disagreed, stating that "[t]he selection of jurors represents a unique
governmental function delegated to private litigants by the government and
attributable to the government for purposes of invoking constitutional pro-
tections against discrimination by reason of race.'" 324 Moreover, the Court
concluded that, due to the significance of the civil courtroom in society, a
private litigant has a sufficient interest in challenging the discriminatory ex-
clusion of a juror on that person's behalf.325
The Texas courts have already begun addressing the issues raised by Ed-
monson. In Powers v. Palacios 326 the Texas supreme court remanded the
case for a new trial where counsel for the defendant admitted that race "fig-
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. 809 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, writ granted).
315. 806 S.W.2d 879 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied).
316. Diamond Shamrock, 809 S.W.2d at 522-23; Methodist Hosps., 806 S.W.2d at 885.
317. TEX. R. Civ. P. 272.
318. 806 S.W.2d at 885.
319. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
320. Id. at 89.
321. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S.Ct. 2077, 2088 (1991).
322. Edmonson v, Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1990)(en banc).
323. Id. at 221-22.
324. 111 S.Ct. at 2086.
325. Id. at 2087-88.
326. 813 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1991).
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ured into" his exercise of a peremptory strike against the only black member
of the jury panel in a personal injury suit brought by a black plaintiff.3 27
Although the court provided no express guidance on the appropriate burden
of proof, it found that counsel's remarks were sufficient to establish invidious
discrimination, 328 notwithstanding counsel's further statement that the ju-
ror's race was not the sole reason for her being struck. In Pierson v. Noon 329
the court followed criminal precedents in holding that a party must lodge his
objection regarding the discriminatory use of peremptory strikes before the
jury is sworn and the remainder of the venire discharged. 330
The timeliness of a jury demand was at issue in Halsell v. Dehoyos. 331 The
supreme court held that a request for a jury trial that is untimely under rule
216332 becomes timely if the case is reset for trial more than thirty days from
the date the request was filed.333 Moreover, the court went on to hold that a
trial court's error in denying a timely request for a jury trial is harmless only
if the record shows that there were no material issues of fact and an in-
structed verdict would have been appropriate. 334
Thomas v. City of O'Donnel 335 involved the question of when a party
must object to a trial court seating a jury of less than twelve. Pursuant to
rule 235,336 a trial court is required to draw or summon additional jurors if
the use of peremptory challenges leaves the jury incomplete.3 37 The Thomas
court held that the plaintiff did not waive his objection to an incomplete jury
by waiting until the peremptory challenges were actually exercised, rather
than objecting when the possibility of an insufficient number of jurors first
arose (iLe., when the venire was reduced to fewer than twenty-four). 338 Per-
haps more significantly, the court stated in dicta that rule 235339 does not
require anything of the parties when the jury is left incomplete due to pre-
emptory challenges, but instead places the onus on the trial judge to direct
that additional jurors be drawn or summoned. 34° It is unclear if the court
meant to imply by this latter statement that the plaintiff could have raised
his objection even later in the proceedings.
327. Id. at 490-91 and n.1.
328. Id. at 491.
329. 814 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
330. Id. at 508.
331. 810 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. 1991)(per curiam).
332. TEX. R. Civ. P. 216 (jury demand must be filed not less than thirty days before date
set for trial).
333. 810 S.W.2d at 371. The court specifically disapproved the opinion in Brawner v. Arel-
lano, 757 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. App.-San Antonio), pet. dism'd by agr., 758 S.W.2d 756 (Tex.
1988), to the extent it is inconsistent with the holding in Halsell. 810 S.W.2d at 372 n.l.
334. 810 S.W.2d at 372.
335. 811 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1991, no writ).
336. TEX. R. Civ. P. 235.
337. Id.
338. 811 S.W.2d at 759.
339. TEX. R. Civ. P. 235.
340. 811 S.W.2d at 759.
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XIV. JUDGMENT, DISMISSAL, AND MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL
In Landmark American Insurance Co. v. Pulse Ambulance Services,
Inc. 341 the Texas supreme court held that, where a trial court orders a remit-
titur pursuant to a timely-filed "motion for new trial, or in the alternative,
for remittitur," the time for appeal runs from the date of such order rather
than the date of the original judgment. 342 The court distinguished a Texas
Commission of Appeals' decision 343, which held that a voluntary remittitur
was not a modification of the prior judgment,344 on the basis that the defend-
ant's motion in effect asked the trial court to correct an error in the
judgment.345
Cecil v. Smith 346 involved the procedure for preserving appellate com-
plaints of no evidence and factual insufficiency of the evidence. The supreme
court held that a timely-filed motion for new trial raising these issues, re-
gardless of whether it is overruled by written order or by operation of law, is
all that is required to preserve error for appellate review. 347 The supreme
court rejected the court of appeals' reading of Texas Rule of Appellate Pro-
cedure 52(a)348 as requiring the movant to call her motion for new trial to
the trial court's attention, concluding that the more specific provisions of the
appellate and district court rules governing preservation of error in motions
for new trial 349 controlled over the general rule for preserving error.350
Several cases decided during the Survey period addressed the procedure
for the dismissal of cases for want of prosecution and their subsequent rein-
statement. In General Electric Co. v. Falcon Ridge Apartments, Joint Ven-
ture351 the supreme court observed that the district clerk is not required to
note on the docket sheet either the mailing of the notice of intent to dismiss
an action for want of prosecution or the notice of the signing of an order of
dismissal.352 Thus, the absence of affirmative proof that notice was sent does
not establish error on the face of the record, and an appeal from the dismis-
sal by writ of error is not appropriate.353 The court noted, however, that the
dismissal could be attacked by bill of review.354 The supreme court also
held, in Thordson v. City of Houston,355 that the language of rule 165a 356
341. 813 S.W.2d 492 (Tex. 1991)(per curiam).
342. Id. at 499.
343. See Pope v. Wedgeworth, 221 S.W. 950 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1920, holding approved).
344. Id. at 951.
345. 813 S.W.2d at 498-99.
346. 804 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. 1991).
347. Id. at 511-12.
348. TEX. R. App. P. 52(a).
349. TEx. R. App. P. 52(d); TEX. R. Civ. P. 324.
350. 804 S.W.2d at 511-12.
351. 811 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. 1991).
352. Id. at 943.
353. Id. at 943-44. Compare with Langdale v. Villamil, 813 S.W.2d 187, 190-91 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ) (allowing appeal by writ of error where record
reflected notice of trial setting to defendant's disbarred attorney).
354. 811 S.W.2d at 944 n.2.
355. 815 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. 1991)(per curiam).
356. TEx. R. Civ. P. 165a.
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requires that an oral hearing be held on any timely motion to reinstate.3 7
And in Charles L. Hardtke, Inc. v. Katz358 the court held that a written
docket entry, which was specific and initialed by the trial judge, was suffi-
cient as an order of reinstatement. 359
Default judgment procedure was at issue in several cases during the Sur-
vey period. In Long v. McDermott 360 a divided court of appeals held that,
after the citation and petition have been served on the defendant, the plaintiff
is not obliged to provide a separate notice of the hearing on damages if the
defendant fails to answer.361 Conversely, in a post-answer default situation,
Langdale v. Villamil362 held that notice to the defendant of the trial setting
must affirmatively appear in the record.3 63 According to the Langdale
court, the contrary holding in Prihoda v. Marek 364 poses too great a threat
of "mischief" to the constitutional guarantee of notice and an opportunity to
be heard. 365
Finally, in a case that should be of interest to any trial practitioner who
has ever tried to enforce a money judgment, the supreme court held in
Briones v. Solomon 366 that post-judgment interest is "interest" within the
meaning of the Texas usury statutes.367 Thus, the court held that the statu-
tory penalties can apply to a demand for payment of usurious post-judgment
interest.3 68
XV. APPELLATE PROCEDURE
A. Perfecting the Appeal
Several cases decided during the Survey period concerned the effect of a
party's technical mistake in attempting to perfect an appeal. Two of the
cases involved the filing of a notice of appeal under the wrong cause number.
Although these cases presented nearly identical facts, and both were decided
by the same court, the result in each case was different.
In Evans v. Evans369 the appellant filed a cost bond seeking to appeal a
357. 815 S.W.2d at 550.
358. 813 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1991, no writ).
359. Id. at 550. Compare with Zavaletta v. Cellular Engineering, Ltd., 805 S.W.2d 915,
916 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, no writ) (oral pronouncement and docket entry will not
substitute for written order for purposes of granting motion for new trial).
360. 813 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ).
361. Id. at 624. In the dissent's view, the failure to provide such notice was in violation of
due process. Id. at 625.
362. 813 S.W.2d at 187.
363. Id. at 191.
364. 797 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied).
365. 813 S.W.2d at 191.
366. 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 92 (November 6, 1991).
367. Id. at 94.
368. Id. The judgment creditor's problem in Briones arose when its attorney sent a second
demand letter to one of three judgment debtors, after a portion of the judgment had been paid
by the other two. Although the renewed demand correctly reflected the reduced principal
amount of the judgment, it failed to adjust the per diem amount demanded as post-judgment
interest.
369. 809 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, no writ).
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severed cause within the thirty-day time limit specified in rule 41(a)(1). 370
Appellant's bond, however, contained the original cause number rather than
the cause number of the severed case. Therefore, the appellee requested the
court to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the cost bond did not perfect
the appeal because it was filed in the wrong case. The court refused appel-
lee's request because there was no confusion concerning which judgment the
appellant was seeking to appeal, and instead allowed the appellant to file an
amended bond. 37' In doing so, the court made two observations. First, rule
46372 does not require that a cost bond contain the trial court's cause
number.373 Second, a defective bond does not defeat the jurisdiction of the
court of appeals. 374 The court went on to distinguish Philbrook v. Berry375
in which the supreme court held that a motion for new trial filed in the
wrong cause did not extend the trial court's plenary power over a default
judgment. 376 According to the court, Philbrook was not controlling as it
addressed only motions for new trial and not cost bonds on appeal. 377
Only three months earlier, however, in City of San Antonio v. Rodri-
guez 378 the same court of appeals expressly relied on Philbrook in dismissing
an appeal under circumstances nearly identical to those in Evans. The ap-
pellant in Rodriguez had also filed his notice of apea1379 under the wrong
cause number. Simultaneously, the appellant filed a motion to modify judg-
ment, again with the wrong cause number. Based on the holding in Phil-
brook, the court of appeals held that neither the motion to modify nor the
notice of appeal was timely filed inasmuch as both instruments were filed in
the wrong case. 380 Although the Rodriguez opinion contains a lengthy dis-
cussion of Philbrook and other similar cases involving misfiled motions for
new trial,38' the court made no effort, as it did three months later in Evans,
to distinguish these cases from a situation involving a misfiled notice of
appeal.
Although the circumstances were slightly different in Grand Prairie In-
dependent School District v. Southern Parts Imports, Inc.38 2 the supreme
370. TEX. R. App. 41(a)(1) (a party perfecting an appeal is required to file his cost bond or
other security within thirty days after the judgment is signed unless any party has timely filed a
motion for new trial or a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law in a case tried
without a jury).
371. 809 S.W.2d at 574; see TEX. R. App. P. 46(f) (court of appeals may permit a party to
amend his cost bond to cure a defect in substance or form).
372. TEX. R. App. P. 46.
373. 809 S.W.2d at 574.
374. Id. (citing Davis v. Jeffries, 764 S.W.2d 559, 560 (Tex. 1989)(per curiam).
375. 683 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. 1985).
376. Id. at 379.
377. 809 S.W.2d at 574.
378. 810 S.W.2d 405 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, no writ).
379. As a municipality, the appellant in Rodriguez was not required to file security for costs
on appeal; a timely-filed written notice of appeal was sufficient to perfect its appeal. See TEX.
R. App. P. 40(a)(2).
380. 810 S.W.2d at 407.
381. See, e.g., Richie v. Ranchlander Nat'l Bank, 724 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. App.-Austin
1986, no writ); Southland Paint v. Thousand Oaks Racquet Club, 687 S.W.2d 455 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ).
382. 813 S.W.2d 499 (Tex. 1991)(per curiam).
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court's decision in that case should eliminate the confusion engendered by
the conflicting rulings in Evans and Rodriguez. One of the appellants in
Grand Prairie, a school district, filed a notice of appeal rather than an appeal
bond. The court of appeals, after concluding that the suit did not involve the
collection of delinquent taxes, 383 held that the school district was required to
post an appeal bond to perfect its appeal.384 The court, therefore, dismissed
the appeal for want of jurisdiction due to the school district's failure to post
the required bond.38 5 The supreme court reversed that decision because the
school district's timely filing of the notice of appeal constituted "a bona fide
attempt to invoke appellate court jurisdiction. '38 6 Engaging in an analysis
virtually identical to that contained in the Evans opinion, the court held that
rules 46387 and 83388 reflect a policy of liberally permitting appellants to
amend appeal bonds.389 On the authority of these rules, the court held that
appellate courts may not dismiss an appeal when the appellant files the
wrong instrument to perfect that appeal without first allowing the appellant
to amend or refile the instrument to cure the defect.39°
B. The Record on Appeal
Rule 53391 permits an appellant to request only a partial statement of facts
so long as he includes in his request a statement of the points he relies upon
for appeal. 392 If an appellant chooses this route, he is limited to the points
he has specified; but he is also entitled to a presumption that nothing omitted
from the partial statement of facts is relevant to those points. 393 The
supreme court stated in Schafer v. Conner,394 however, that an appellant
who complains of the legal or factual sufficiency of evidence may not take
advantage of the procedure set forth in rule 53.395 An appellant in those
383. As a general rule, school districts are required to post appeal bonds in order to perfect
an appeal. See Wilson v. Thompson, 162 Tex. 390, 391-94, 348 S.W.2d 17, 18-19 (1961) (per
curiam). School districts are exempt from the bond requirement, however, if they are appeal-
ing from a suit to collect delinquent taxes. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 33.49(a) (Vernon
1982); Brady Indep. School Dist. v. Davenport, 663 S.W.2d 637, 638-39 (Tex. App.-Austin
1983, no writ).
384. Grand Prairie Indep. School Dist. v. Southern Parts Imports, Inc., 803 S.W.2d 762,
764 (Tex. App.-Dallas), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 813 S.W.2d 499 (Tex. 1991)(per curiam).
385. Id.
386. 813 S.W.2d at 500 (quoting Walker v. Blue Water Garden Apts., 776 S.W.2d 578, 581
(Tex. 1989).
387. TEX. R. App. P. 46(f) (see supra text accompanying note 352).
388. TEX. R. App. P. 83 (courts of appeal should allow reasonable time to correct or
amend form or substance defects in appeal procedures).
389. 813 S.W.2d at 500.
390. Id. In adopting this holding, the court expressly disapproved the cases of Eagle Life
Ins. Co. v. Hernandez, 743 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1987, writ denied); Piano Indep.
School Dist. v. Oake, 682 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 692
S.W.2d 454 (Tex. 1985); and Marshall v. Brown, 635 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1982,
writ ref'd n.r.e.). Id. at 500 n.4.
391. TEX. R. App. P. 53(d).
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. 813 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam).
395. Id. at 155.
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circumstances can discharge his burden of showing error in the judgment
only if he brings forward a complete or an agreed statement of facts.396
Wilkins v. Reisman 397 also involved an incomplete statement of facts on
appeal. The court reporter was to blame in Wilkins, however, because she
lost one-half of her trial notes and could not prepare a full statement of facts.
In these circumstances, a reversal is generally automatic. 398 The appellee
argued, however, that the appellant could not take advantage of the record's
inadequacy in this case because she had never challenged the jury's finding
of zero damages. Although some courts have adopted a rule that any error
in a verdict on liability issues is harmless where a zero damage finding goes
unchallenged, 399 the court refused to apply this rule in Wilkins. The court
noted that application of the "rule" cited by appellee had been limited to
cases in which the losing plaintiff's points on appeal challenged only the
liability issues.4 °
The appellant in Wilkins, however, challenged the fairness of the entire
trial in addition to the liability issues. Specifically, the appellant asserted
error in the trial court's handling of voir dire and its exclusion of evidence,
"both of which could potentially contaminate the entire case, including the
jury's damage findings." 4 1 Because the partial statement of facts prepared
by the reporter did not contain the transcription of the voir dire examination
and other portions of the trial pertinent to the claimed error, the court of
appeals was unable to fairly review appellant's complaint. 4 2 Therefore, the
court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial.4 3
Finally, the court in Fleming v. Taylor 4o 4 held that an appellant cannot
complain of the trial court's failure to file findings of fact and conclusions of
law if he does not file the required notice with the clerk within the thirty-day
time period specified in rule 297.405 Although the appellant missed this
396. Id.; accord Englander Co. v. Kennedy, 428 S.W.2d 806, 807 (Tex. 1968). In Shafer
the supreme court expressly disapproved the court of appeals' alternative holding that Tex. R.
App. P. 53(d) required an appellant's statement of points to be filed in the same instrument as
appellant's request for a partial statement of facts. 813 S.W.2d at 155. Characterizing this
holding as "hypertechnical," the supreme court implied that the statement of points need only
be filed with the request for a partial statement of facts. Id.
397. 803 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
398. Id. at 823 (citing Wolters v. Wright, 623 S.W.2d 301, 305 (Tex. 1981)).
399. See, e.g., Easley v. Castle Manor Nursing, 731 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1987, no writ); Wooley v. West, 575 S.W.2d 659, 660 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
400. 803 S.W.2d at 823.
401. Id.
402. Id. at 825. In a concurring opinion, one justice noted that Texas courts had previ-
ously found that proper challenges to alleged error in voir dire and exclusions of admissible
evidence were sufficient to preserve the points for appeal without any additional requirement
that the appellant allege error in the jury findings. Id. at 826 (Sears, J. concurring) (citing
Babcock v. Northwest Memorial Hosp., 767 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. 1989); and Grain v. Hill
County, 613 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). According to the
concurrence, the error was not in the jury's failure to find, but rather in the court's failure to
give the jury the opportunity to find. 803 S.W.2d at 826 (Sears, J. concurring).
403. 803 S.W.2d at 826.
404. 814 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, no writ).
405. Id. at 91; See TEX. R. Civ. P. 297 (if the court has not responded timely to the
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deadline by only two days, the court held that he had waived the alleged
error.40 6
C. Requirements of Briefs
Rule 131407 limits the length of an application for writ of error to fifty
pages.408 If an application fails to comply with this rule, the supreme court
may order that it be redrawn. 40 9 Two cases decided during the Survey pe-
riod emphasize that this briefing requirement should not be taken lightly. In
Buffalo v. Robbins410 for example, the supreme court ordered petitioners to
redraw their applications and overruled their request for an enlargement of
the page limitation. Although the petitioners subsequently filed redrawn ap-
plications, they again apparently ignored the fifty page limitation. Conse-
quently, the court dismissed the application. 411 A similar fate befell the
petitioner's application in White Budd Van Ness Partnership v. Major-Gladys
Drive Joint Venture.412 The petitioner in White Budd technically complied
with the fifty-page maximum, but only by reducing print and margin sizes to
a point where the application was difficult to read. The court, therefore,
struck the application and criticized petitioner's maneuver as a violation of
the spirit, if not the letter, of rule 131(i). 413
The court displayed greater leniency in Weaver v. Southwest National
Bank.414 The appellant in Weaver, following a briefing practice that is fairly
routine, set forth the factual statements in his brief in a single section that
was separate from his arguments and authorities relating to each point. The
court of appeals, deeming this practice a violation of the briefing require-
ments of rule 74,415 decided that appellant's brief was inadequate and re-
fused to consider all but one of appellant's points of error.416 The supreme
court disagreed, noting that the only "inadequacy" of appellant's brief was
its failure to restate the facts and record references under each point of er-
ror.417 Pointing to another section of rule 74,418 the court stated that brief-
ing rules are to be construed liberally and that substantial compliance with
the rules is sufficient.419 Because the "Fact Statement" section of appellant's
brief included all facts relied upon for the appeal, a majority of the court
original request, counsel must file a "Notice of Past Due Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law" with the clerk).
406. 814 S.W.2d at 91.
407. TEX. R. App. P. 131(i).
408. Id. 131(i).
409. Id. 131(j).
410. 811 S.W.2d 541 (Tex. 1991).
411. Id. at 541-42.
412. 811 S.W.2d 541 (Tex. 1991).
413. Id. at 541.
414. 813 S.W.2d 481 (Tex. 1991)(per curiam).
415. TEX. R. App. P. 74(f) (requiring that appellant's argument include a fair, condensed
statement of the facts pertinent to each point together with a discussion of the facts and au-
thorities relied upon to maintain the point).
416. 813 S.W.2d at 481.
417. Id. at 482.
418. TEX. R. App. P. 74(p).
419. 813 S.W.2d at 482.
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concluded that appellant had substantially complied with the briefing re-
quirements of the rule.420
D. Miscellaneous
Rule 60421 permits a court to dismiss a party's appeal for failure to comply
with any order of the court.422 Based on this rule, the court of appeals in
O'Connor v. Sam Houston Medical Hospital, Inc.423 dismissed appellant's
appeal due to the failure to comply with the trial court's orders compelling
post-judgment discovery. 424 The supreme court reversed that judgment and
held that rule 60(a) does not authorize dismissal of an appeal for failure to
comply with a trial court's order.425 According to the court, the phrase
"order of the court" in rule 60(a) refers only to orders of the court of ap-
peals. 426 The court hastened to add, however, that it was not deciding
whether a court of appeals may ever properly dismiss an appeal due to an
appellant's failure to comply with a trial court order.427 Under appropriate
circumstances, therefore, authority for such a dismissal presumably exists
elsewhere in the rules or case law.
Under City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Authority428 and its prog-
eny,429 a summary judgment can neither be reversed nor affirmed on any
ground that is not specifically presented in the motion for summary judg-
ment.430 In what the Austin court of appeals considered to be a logical ex-
tension of this rule, Carlisle v. Phillip Morris, Inc.431 held that the ground
specified in a summary judgment is the only one on which the judgment can
be affirmed. 432 At least one other case433 stands for the contrary proposi-
tion, however, and the supreme court will hopefully resolve the conflict
when it considers Carlisle next term.
XVI. RES JUDICATA
In Eagle Properties, Ltd. v. Scharbauer434 the supreme court considered
420. Id.
421. TEX. R. App. P. 60.
422. Id. 60(a)
423. 802 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990), rev'd, 807 S.W.2d 574 (Tex.
1991).
424. Id. at 251.
425. 807 S.W.2d at 576. In reaching this conclusion, the court pointed out that no other
court had ever held that Tex. R. App. P. 60(a) or its predecessor, TEX. R. Civ. P. 387, author-
ized dismissal of an appeal because of the violation of a trial court's order. Id.
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. 589 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. 1979).
429. See, e.g., Dhillon v. General Accident Ins. Co., 789 S.W.2d 293, 295 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ); Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Wheelabrator Coal
Servs., Co., 788 S.W.2d 933, 936 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ).
430. 589 S.W.2d at 675-77.
431. 805 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. App.-Austin, Feb. 6, 1991, writ requested).
432. Id. at 501.
433. See Veytia v. Seiter, 740 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987), aff'd, 756
S.W.2d 303 (Tex. 1988).
434. 807 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. 1990).
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whether the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel precluded a state
action that was filed after the settlement of a federal case involving different
parties but the same subject matter. The case arose out of a sale-leaseback
transaction for the First National Bank Building in Midland, Texas. Less
than a year before its collapse, the First National Bank sold its building to
plaintiff, a partnership composed of wealthy Midland residents that were
hand-picked by the bank's president. The partnership financed part of the
purchase price by executing promissory notes in favor of the bank. Simulta-
neously with the sale, the bank entered into a long term lease for the building
that was intended to generate income to the partnership sufficient for the
repayment of the notes. When the bank was declared insolvent less than a
year after the transaction, the FDIC, as receiver, brought suit in federal
court to collect on the promissory notes. The partnership filed a counter-
claim in the federal suit, alleging that the bank had fraudulently induced it
to enter into the sale-leaseback transaction. Following a non-jury trial, the
district court held that the bank had not fraudulently induced the partner-
ship to enter into the transaction or execute the promissory notes.435
Although the partnership appealed this adverse judgment, the parties en-
tered into a settlement agreement while the case was on appeal. The settle-
ment agreement explicitly preserved the partnership's right to file future
claims against the bank's former officers and directors, but it did not provide
for a vacating of the trial court's judgment in favor of the FDIC. Subse-
quent to the settlement agreement, the partnership and its partners filed suit
in state court against the bank's former officers and directors alleging fraud,
negligence, breach of fiduciary duties, and violations of the Texas Deceptive
Trade Practices Act (DTPA).436 The defendants in the state court suit ob-
tained summary judgment as to the entire case on the basis that all of plain-
tiffs' claims had been or could have been determined in the federal suit and,
therefore, they were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel. Although
the court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment 437, the supreme court
reversed the judgment in part, holding that the doctrine of res judicata did
not apply under the circumstances of the case and that several of plaintiffs'
claims were not barred by collateral estoppel.438
The supreme court began its analysis by reviewing the federal law of res
judicata.439 As a general rule, the court noted, state claims that could have
been brought in a prior federal court action may not be asserted in a subse-
quent state court suit.440 A subsequent action based on the state claims
would not be precluded, however, if the federal court did not possess juris-
435. FDIC v. Eagle Properties, Ltd., 664 F. Supp. 1027 (W.D. Tex. 1985).
436. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE § 17.001 et. seq. (Vernon 1988).
437. 758 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1988), rev'd in part, aff'd in part, 807 S.W.2d
714 (Tex. 1990).
438. 807 S.W.2d at 725.
439. Since the first suit was decided in federal court, the supreme court concluded that
federal law controlled the determination of whether res judicata would bar a later state court
proceeding. Id. at 718 (citing Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710, 715 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 908 (1975); and Jeanes v. Henderson, 688 S.W.2d 100, 103 (Tex. 1985)).
440. 807 S.W.2d at 718.
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diction over the omitted state claims or clearly would have declined to exer-
cise its jurisdiction as a matter of discretion."' The initial question
presented by the case, therefore, was whether the federal court would have
exercised ancillary or pendent party jurisdiction" 2 over the plaintiffs' state
court claims against the bank's officers and directors if the partnership had
asserted those claims in the federal lawsuit."43 The court answered this
question in the negative based on the United States Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Finley v. United States.4 4 According to the court, Finley does not
permit a trial court to exercise pendent-party jurisdiction unless the text of a
jurisdiction statute explicitly grants, or manifests an intent to grant, jurisdic-
tion over additional parties." 5 Jurisdiction in the federal suit was predicated
on the statute conferring jurisdiction over civil suits involving the FDIC." 6
Since that statute explicitly grants jurisdiction only over claims to which the
FDIC is a party," 7 the Eagle Properties court found that the federal district
court would not have had jurisdiction over the state law claims subsequently
filed by the plaintiffs against the bank's officers and directors."48 Accord-
ingly, res judicata did not preclude plaintiffs from asserting those claims in
the state court suit." 9
Next, the court addressed the issue of collateral estoppel. 450 Pivotal to the
court's determination was whether the federal court's finding that the bank
had not defrauded plaintiff was merely an alternative holding in support of
the FDIC's judgment.45' Based on a review of the federal court's opinion,
441. Id. (citing Jeanes, 688 S.W.2d at 104).
442, "Ancillary jurisdiction generally involves claims asserted defensively... or by a party
'whose rights might be irretrievably lost unless he could assert them in an ongoing action in a
federal court.'" 807 S.W.2d at 719 n.3 (quoting Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437
U.S. 365 (1987)). Pendent-party jurisdiction is an amalgamation of ancillary and pendent-
claim jurisdiction, and involves jurisdiction over parties not named in claims before the federal
court and over whom there is no independent basis of federal jurisdiction. Id. As noted by the
Eagle Properties court, the federal courts have so far failed to definitively distinguish between
ancillary jurisdiction and pendent-party jurisdiction. Id. In 1990, Congress codified "ancil-
lary" and "pendant" jurisdiction under the caption of "supplementary jurisdiction" at 28
U.S.C. § 1367. Under subsection (b) of this statute, there is no substantive change from prior
case law on the subject of supplemental jurisdiction. However, subsection (a) provides supple-
mental jurisdiction to federal district courts over related claims forming a part of the same case
or controversy as the underlying action, including claims involving joinder or intervention of
additional parties. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1990). See also C.D.S. Diversified, Inc. v. Franchise Fin.
Corp. of America, 757 F.Supp. 202 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); Krenzfeld A.G. v. Carnehammar, 138
F.R.D. 594 (S.D. Fla. 1991); Port Allen Marine Servs., Inc. v. Chotin, 765 F.Supp. 887 (M.D.
La. 1991).
443. 807 S.W.2d at 718-19. The court identified this question only after first determining
that there would have been no independent basis of federal jurisdiction over the claims plain-
tiffs later asserted against the bank's officers and directors in the state court suit. Id.
444. 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
445. 807 S.W.2d at 719.
446. 12 U.S.C. § 1819 (1988) (providing that federal courts will have jurisdiction over all
suits of a civil nature in which the FDIC is a party, as those suits shall be deemed to arise
under the laws of the United States).
447. See F.D.I.C. v. Israel, 739 F. Supp. 1411, 1413-14 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
448. 807 S.W.2d at 721.
449. Id.
450. Id. at 721-25.
451. Plaintiffs contended that the federal court's finding of an absence of fraud on the part
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the Texas supreme court concluded that the federal district court's findings
regarding fraud did not constitute an alternative holding because the court
had " 'rigorously considered' plaintiff's claims of fraudulent induce-
ment. ' 452 Under Texas law, therefore, collateral estoppel barred relitigation
of the plaintiffs' fraud claims in state court because they had already been
"actually" litigated in the federal suit and were "essential" to the prior judg-
ment.453 The court reached a different result with respect to several of plain-
tiffs' DTPA claims. Specifically, the court held that the DTPA claims that
involved actual intent as an element of the claim 454 could not be relitigated
because the issue of intent was barred by collateral estoppel due to the fed-
eral court's ruling with respect to fraud.455 The court held, however, that
plaintiffs were free to pursue their other DTPA claims because they did not
depend on a finding of intent and involved alleged misrepresentations that
were not actually decided in the federal suit.45 6
In Mower v. Boyer 457 the supreme court faced a choice between two in-
consistent judgments rendered by separate courts. The appeal arose from a
summary judgment entered in favor of a creditor on his promissory note suit
in district court. After the creditor initially had obtained a partial summary
judgment in that suit, the debtor died. The creditor, therefore, commenced a
second suit on the note in probate court while the district court suit was still
pending. When the debtor prevailed in this second suit, the creditor re-
turned to the district court seeking a final judgment and did not appeal the
decision of the probate court. In the district court proceeding, the debtor
affirmatively pled the probate court's judgment as res judicata and collateral
estoppel. The district judge refused to give the probate court's judgment any
preclusive effect, however, since that judgment conflicted with matters the
district court had previously decided by partial summary judgment.4 8 In-
stead, the district court determined anew the issues unresolved by the partial
summary judgment and ultimately entered a final judgment in favor of the
creditor.459 The court of appeals affirmed this judgment on the basis that
the suit in probate court had been barred by res judicata and collateral estop-
pel because the district court entered the partial summary judgment before
of the bank was merely an alternative to the court's finding that the FDIC had a valid defense
to the claim based on its lack of knowledge of the alleged fraud. See FDIC v. Eagle Properties,
Ltd., 664 F. Supp. 1027, 1037, 1045-46 (W.D. Tx. 1985). If a judgment of a court of first
instance is based on determinations of two issues, either of which standing independently
would be sufficient to support the result, the judgment is not conclusive with respect to either
issue standing alone. (Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27, comment (i) (1982)).
452. 807 S.W.2d at 722 (quoting the federal trial court from 664 F.Supp. at 1037).
453. 807 S.W.2d at 722. See Tarter v. Metropolitan Say. & Loan Ass'n, 744 S.W.2d 926,
927 (Tex. 1988). The court also observed that the same result would apply under the federal
law of collateral estoppel. 807 S.W.2d at 722 (citing Hicks v. Quaker Oats Co., 662 F.2d 1158,
1168-70 (5th Cir. 1981). Therefore, the court did not decide the choice of law issue. 807
S.W.2d at 721.
454. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE § 17.46(b)(23) (Vernon 1986).
455. 807 S.W.2d at 724.
456. Id.
457. 811 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1991).




the probate court ruled.46°
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals' judgment, agreeing with
the debtor that the decision in the later-filed probate suit barred the credi-
tor's continued litigation in the district court.461 The court stated that the
partial summary judgment entered by the district court was not entitled to
either res judicata or collateral estoppel effect in the probate suit because the
district court's partial summary judgment was only interlocutory; it could
not support the creditor's plea of res judicata.462 Likewise, the interlocutory
summary judgment failed to satisfy any of the three criteria463 established
for collateral estoppel purposes.4M The judgment entered by the probate
court, on the other hand, was entitled to preclusive effect in district court
under the collateral estoppel doctrine.465 The court held that the relevant
issues had been fairly litigated in the probate suit involving the creditor, and
these issues were clearly essential to the probate court's judgment.466 Hav-
ing decided the case on the narrower ground of collateral estoppel, the court
saw no need to address whether the probate court's judgment was entitled to
res judicata effect. 467
XVII. MISCELLANEOUS
A. Notice of Trial Setting
Before its amendment, rule 245468 authorized courts to set contested cases
for trial on the motion of any party, with reasonable notice of not less than
ten days to the parties. 469 The plaintiff in Langdale v. Villami 4 70 attempted
to comply with this rule by serving notice of the trial setting on defendant's
counsel. Defendant's counsel had been disbarred, however, almost a year
before the notice was delivered. Since this disbarment terminated the attor-
ney-client relationship, 471 the court concluded that plaintiff's notice to the
460. Mower v. Boyer, 795 S.W.2d 292, 293 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]), rev'd, 811
S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1991).
461. 811 S.W.2d at 562.
462. Id.
463. According to the court, a prior adjudication of an issue will be given collateral estop-
pel effect only if it meets all three factors considered in determining whether the issue was
adequately deliberated and firm. Id. These factors are: (1) whether the parties were fully
heard, (2) whether the court supported its decision with a reasoned opinion, and (3) whether
the decision was subject to appeal or was in fact reviewed on appeal. See Scurlock Oil Co. v.
Smithwick, 724 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Tex. 1986).
464. 811 S.W.2d at 562.
465. Id. at 563.
466. Id. These facts satisfied the three requirements for invocation of the collateral estop-
pel doctrine that have been articulated by the supreme court in its prior decisions. See, e.g.,
Eagle Properties, Ltd. v. Scharbauer, 807 S.W.2d 714, 721 (Tex. 1991); Bonniwell v. Beech
Aircraft Corp., 663 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex. 1984).
467. 811 S.W.2d at 563 n.3.
468. TEX. R. Civ. P. 245 (1976), amended April 24, 1990 and effective September 1, 1990.
469. Id. The amended rule requires forty-five days advance notice to the parties of a first
setting for trial. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 245.
470. 813 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ).
471. See Royden v. Ardoin, 160 Tex. 338, 331 S.W.2d 206, 209 (1960).
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attorney could not be imputed to the defendant. 472 Because defendant did
not otherwise receive notice of the trial setting, the court held that the entry
of a default judgment against the defendant due to his nonappearance at trial
constituted a denial of due process. 473 The court disregarded the judgment's
recital that due notice of the trial was given to the defendant 474 According
to the court, it need not indulge the usual presumptions of validity in sup-
port of a judgment in the case of a direct attack on a default judgment.47"
B. Filing of Pleadings
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 5476 provides that a filing by mail will be
deemed timely if it is deposited in the United States mail on or before the last
day for filing and received by the clerk not more than ten days after the filing
deadline.477 Practitioners who wait until the last moment to file their instru-
ments should take note of the decision in Carpenter v. Town and Country
Bank.478 In Carpenter, the defendants sent their motion for new trial to the
clerk on the thirtieth day after the judgment was entered.479 Evidencing a
questionable lack of confidence in the postal service, the defendants elected
to send their motion by UPS. Defendants subsequently filed an appeal bond,
apparently believing that the motion for new trial had extended to ninety
days the period in which they could perfect an appeal of the trial court's
judgment.480 The court of appeals held that defendants did not timely per-
fect their appeal because the cost bond was not filed within thirty days of the
judgment.481 Defendant's motion for new trial failed to extend the appellate
period because it too was untimely.482 Accordingly, defendants could not
rely on rule 5 to enlarge the filing period for their motion for new trial be-
cause they sent the motion by a private courier rather than using the U.S.
mail as required by the rule.483
C. Sanctions
In Koslow's v. Mackie484 the supreme court upheld a trial court's entry of
a default judgment as a sanction for defendant's failure to participate in the
472. 813 S.W.2d at 190 (citing Beck v. Arondino, 20 Tex. 330, 50 S.W. 207, 209 (1899, no
writ) (notice acquired by attorney after termination of attorney-client relationship is not im-
puted to former client)).
473. 813 S.W.2d at 190.
474. Id. at 189.
475. Id.
476. TEX. R. Civ. P. 5.
477. Id. The appellate rules contain an identical provision for filings made with the appel-
late courts. See TEX. R. App. P. 4(b).
478. 806 S.W.2d 959 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1991, writ denied).
479. A motion for new trial is due to be filed on or before thirty days after the judgment is
signed. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b.
480. In order to perfect an appeal, a party must file its appeal bond within thirty days after
the judgment is signed, or within ninety days after that date if any party has timely filed a
motion for new trial. TEX. R. App. P. 41(a)(l).
481. 806 S.W.2d at 960.
482. Id.
483. Id.
484. 796 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. 1990).
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preparation of a joint status report. 48 5 The trial court in Koslow's sent a
letter to the parties requesting them to confer about various pretrial matters
and to provide the court with a status report. The letter also advised the
parties that failure to comply with the request could result in a show cause
hearing in which the court would consider imposing sanctions on the recalci-
trant party. After the defendants, who were appearing in the case pro se,
failed to confer with their opponents or to appear at the subsequently sched-
uled show cause hearing, the trial court entered a default judgment in favor
of the plaintiff.4 86 Although the court of appeals refused to condone defend-
ant's conduct, it nevertheless reversed the default judgment, holding that the
trial court was not empowered to sanction the defendants for a failure to
confer with their opponent.4 87 According to the court of appeals, rule
166488 permits a judge to order the parties to appear for a conference, but it
does not authorize an order that the parties confer with each other outside
the court.489
The supreme court reversed, ruling that the court of appeals erred in so
narrowly confining the meaning of "an appearance" under rule 166.490 Rule
166, said the court, must be read in conjunction with rule 7 of the Rules of
Judicial Administration, 49 1 which provides for the use of telephone or mail
in lieu of personal appearances for various matters, including pretrial confer-
ences.492 Thus, the trial court's power to require an appearance under rule
166 includes the express power to order an appearance by written report
filed by mail. 493 The court also observed that the pretrial conference rule
would be meaningless if the trial court did not have the power to require the
action described in the rule.494 The court concluded, therefore, that the trial
judge had implicit power under rule 166 to provide in his pretrial order that
noncompliance would result in a "disposition hearing, at which time cause
will have to be shown why dismissal, default, or other sanctions should not
be imposed. '495
D. Attorney's Fees
In Gill Savings Association v. Chair King, Inc. 496 the supreme court upheld
a trial court's award of appellate attorney's fees in a non-jury case even
though the prevailing party's attorney failed to testify about those fees at
485. Id. at 705.
486. Id. at 702.
487. Mackie v. Koslow's, 774 S.W.2d 741, 743 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1989), rev'd sub nom.
Koslow's v. Mackie, 796 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. 1990).
488. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166 (allowing a trial court at its discretion to order the parties to
appear for a pretrial conference to aid in the disposition of the case).
489. 774 S.W.2d at 742. o
490. 796 S.W.2d at 703.
491. TEx. R. JUDICIAL ADMIN. 7a(6)(b).




496. 797 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. 1990).
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trial. 497 During the trial, plaintiff's attorney gave testimony as to the
amount and reasonableness of his client's fees incurred through trial, but he
neglected to offer any evidence about the fees his client would reasonably
and necessarily incur on appeal. The court in a non-jury trial may take judi-
cial notice of the usual and customary attorney's fees and of the contents of
the case file without receiving further evidence. 498 The supreme court,
therefore, held that the trial court's own proceedings together with the trial
judge's ability to take judicial notice of usual and customary fees on appeal
constituted some evidence to support the attorney fee award. 499 The court
also permitted plaintiff to recover attorney's fees he had incurred in a related
bankruptcy proceeding, expressly disapproving the court of appeal's earlier
holding that those fees were nonrecoverable in a breach of contract action as
a matter of law.500
497. Id. at 32.
498. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 38.004 (Vernon 1986). The statute provides that it
shall be liberally construed to promote its underlying purposes. Id. § 38.005.
499. 797 S.W.2d at 32.
500. Id.
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